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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Appellants Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc., and its wholly owned 
subsidiary Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. (collectively, "Saint Alphonsus") appeal an 
award in the amount of $36.3 million (plus fees and costs of $2.1 million) on contract and tort 
claims asserted by Respondent MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA"), a business partnership created 
in 1985 by Saint Alphonsus, two other hospitals and a consortium of doctors for the purpose of 
acquiring and operating magnetic resonance imaging ("MRI") equipment. 
The central issue in this case is whether Saint Alphonsus violated MRIA's legal rights by 
its interactions with Intermountain Medical Imaging ("!MI"), a full-service imaging center 
created in 1999 by the group of radiologists that had served the radiology needs of Saint 
Alphonsus's patients for more than twenty years, and by its decision in 2004 to dissociate from 
MRIA and formally affiliate with !MI in the provision of MRI services. At trial, Saint 
Alphonsus presented evidence that its actions were motivated by a desire to promote optimal 
patient care and were entirely consistent with the MRIA partnership agreement and Saint 
Alphonsus's other legal duties. For its part, MRIA argued that Saint Alphonsus had acted with 
bad-faith indifference to its obligations to MRIA and had improperly helped divert MRI business 
from MRIA' s affiliates to IM!. 
Saint Alphonsus contends on appeal that the jury's verdict for MRIA resulted from a 
series of critical legal errors that preordained the result. Specifically, Saint Alphonsus contends 
that the district court incorrectly granted summary judgment for MRIA on its claim that Saint 
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Alphonsus "wrongfully" dissociated from the partnership in 2004, and that the court should 
instead have granted summary judgment for Saint Alphonsus on that claim. Further, the repeated 
references to this legally incorrect holding by the court and MRIA's counsel during trial 
prevented the jury from fairly and impartially evaluating the evidence, and virtually compelled a 
finding of liability on all other claims. This prejudice was compounded, Saint Alphonsus 
contends, by the court's erroneous admission of privileged attorney-client communications 
advising Saint Alphonsus about the legal risks of dissociation and evidence of Saint Alphonsus's 
rejection of an MRlA settlement offer, both of which MRIA used in conjunction with the court's 
holding of"wrongful" dissociation to support the claim of bad-faith conduct. Finally, Saint 
Alphonsus submits that, entirely apart from these errors, it is entitled to judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict because MRIA's proof of damages under two alternative theories is 
legally and factually insufficient, and the amounts claimed and awarded under each bear no 
relationship to injuries actually caused by Saint Alphonsus or suffered by MRJA. 
B. Statement of Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
Saint Alphonsus is a hospital that has served the medical needs of the greater Boise area 
for more than a century. It provides its patients with a full range of medical care, including 
access to top-level radiology services. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 2022, L. 23 top. 2023, L. 17; Tr., Vol. Ill, 
p. 4214, L. 14-25.) Radiology is a medical specialty involving the use of medical imaging 
technologies, such as x-ray, fluoroscopy, ultrasound, CT scan, and MRI, for diagnostic and other 
treatment purposes. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 1093, L. 12 top. 1095, L. 9.) TypicaJJy, a patient in need of 
medical imaging is referred by the patient's treating physician to an imaging facility where 
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technicians use imaging equipment to produce images or "scans" of the patient's body. (/d) 
These scans are then interpreted by a radiologist in consultation with the patient's treating 
physician. (Id) At Saint Alphonsus, the interpretation of medical images has for decades been 
performed by the Saint Alphonsus Radiology Group, also known as Gem State Radiology 
("SARG/GSR"), an organized group of radiologists under an exclusive contract to serve the 
professional radiological needs of Saint Alphonsus's patients. (R., Vol. V, pp. 907, 911.) 
MRIA is an Idaho general partnership formed on April 26, 1985, by Saint Alphonsus, 
two other hospitals and Doctors Magnetic Resonance, Inc. ("DMR"), a corporation created by 
five specialist physicians for the purpose of holding a partnership interest in MRIA. (R., Vol. V ., 
p. 909 i! I 0.) (A fourth hospital joined the partnership in 1995.) The purpose of MRIA was to 
acquire and operate equipment for the then-emerging medical imaging technology known as 
magnetic resonance imaging or MRI. (App. 3 (Trial Ex. 4023 § 1.6).)1 To this end, MRIA 
formed two limited partnerships: MRI Limited Partnership, doing business as MRI Center of 
Idaho ("Center"), which owned and operated an MRI device at a facility located on the Saint 
Alphonsus hospital campus, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership ("Mobile"), which owned and 
operated mobile MRI devices throughout the region. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 1786, L. 11-14; Tr., Vol. Ill, 
p. 2944, L. 17 to p. 2945, L. 11.) Profits from these operations were distributed to the respective 
owners of the Center and Mobile limited partnerships. (Trial Ex. 4024 § 3 .2; Trial Ex. 4028 
§ 3.2.) MRIA owned 30% of each limited partnership, and served as the general partner of both. 
1 Citations to "App._" refer to the pages of the Appendix attached to this brief. The. 
Appendix contains pertinent excerpts of the trial exhibits cited herein. 
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(App. 7, 11, 14, 39 (Trial Ex. 4024 §§ 1.3.2, 4.2; Trial Ex. 4028 § 1.3.2; Trial Ex. 4247, p. 7).)2 
MRIA provides no MRI services directly, but rather derives all of its revenues from the 
distribution of profits based on its ownership interests in Center and Mobile and from a 
"management fee" equal to 7.5% of their revenues. (App. 9, 11, 15-16, 28 (Trial Ex. 4024 
§§ 3.2.2, 4.2; Trial Ex. 4028 §§ 3.2.2, 4.2; Trial Ex. 4118, p. 3).) 
For years following the creation ofMRIA, doctors at Saint Alphonsus used Center for the 
technical service of producing MRI scans, while relying on the radiologists from SARG/GSR for 
the professional service of interpreting those scans. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 2383, L. 4-15.) By 1998, 
SARG/GSR was led by Dr. David Giles, one of the five shareholders ofDMR, and had under his 
leadership recruited several of the nation's top radiologists. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 2654, L. 14 top. 
2655, L. 11; Tr. Vol. III, p. 3026, L. 5-8; Tr., Vol. III, p. 3280, L. 1 top. 3281, L. 2.) These 
radiologists-who with the exception of Dr. Giles did not share in the ownership of MRIA-
began to formulate plans for an outpatient imaging center that would provide a full range of 
medical imaging services, including both MRI and a variety of other imaging services (e.g., CT 
scan) not provided by Center. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 2655, L. 22 top. 2656, L. 9.) Once SARG/GSR 
acquired land in downtown Boise for this purpose, in August 1998, Dr. Giles disclosed the plans 
to Saint Alphonsus and encouraged Saint Alphonsus to get involved. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 3054, 
L. 13 top. 3057, L. 15; id. p. 3061, L. 10 top. 3062, L. 3.) 
2 The remaining ownership interests in Center and Mobile differ from one another, with non-
identical groups of limited partners owning shares. (See App. 7, 14, 39 (Trial Ex. 4024; Trial Ex. 
4028; Trial Ex. 4247 p. 7).) Saint Alphonsus is a limited partner owning 14% of Center and 11% 
of Mobile. (Id.) 
-4-
In response, Saint Alphonsus sought to facilitate a combination of Center's operations 
with those of the SARG/GSR imaging center, first, by arranging a merger ofSARG/GSR's and 
MRIA's respective interests, and, when that effort failed, by working out a deal whereby Saint 
Alphonsus would exchange its interest in Mobile for additional ownership interest in Center and 
purchase the rest of Center outright. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 3067, L. 25 top. 3068, L. 14; id. p. 4014, 
L. 15 top. 4026, L. 3; App. 18, 21-23 (Trial Ex. 4062, p. 2; Trial Ex. 4072, pp. 2-3; Trial Ex. 
4085).) By 2000, it appeared a deal would be reached, but in April or May of that year, DMR 
decided not to support the deal on the terms proposed. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 4023, L. I to p. 4025, L. 
14.) 
The SARG/GSR facility, by then known as IMI, began operations on September I, 1999. 
(Tr., Vol. III, p. 3088, L. 2-4.) Treating physicians at Saint Alphonsus and elsewhere-often due 
to their preexisting relationships with the SARG/GSR radiologists operating IMJ-began 
referring some patients needing MRI scans to IM! instead of Center. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 3909, L. 5 
top. 3910, L. l; id. p. 3994, L. 8 top. 3995, L. 16; id. p. 4138, L. 6 top. 4140, L. 4.) On July 1, 
2001, Saint Alphonsus entered into an operating agreement that by its terms made Saint 
Alphonsus a partner in "the non-MRI portion of [IM!]." (App. 30-31 (Trial Ex. 4226 § 1.1).) At 
the same time, notwithstanding the failure of its efforts in 1999 and 2000, Saint Alphonsus 
continued to seek a mutually beneficial arrangement between the parties, and was advised by 
investment banking firm Shattuck Hammond in connection with that endeavor. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 
3789, L. 16-20; id. p. 3791, L. 19 top. 3792, L. JO.) Shattuck Hammond suggested that Saint 
Alphonsus try to purchase Center and merge it with !MI. (App. 41 (Trial Ex. 4272).) Efforts in 
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that direction foundered, however, when MRIA refused to allow Shattuck Hammond to share 
business valuation data with IMI, and repeated efforts to revive the discussions were abandoned 
in late 2003. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 3810, L. 25 top. 3812, L. 17; id. p. 3815, L. 20 top. 3822, L. 16.) 
With negotiations at an impasse, Saint Alphonsus gave notice on February 24, 2004, of its intent 
to dissociate from MRIA. (See App. 43 (Trial Ex. 4329).) 
Saint Alphonsus's dissociation became effective on April 1, 2004, and on October 18, 
2004, Saint Alphonsus brought this lawsuit seeking a judicial determination of the amount owed 
to it for its interest in the partnership pursuant to Idaho Code§ 53-3-701. (R., Vol. I, pp. 55-62.) 
On May 20, 2005, MRIA filed counterclaims alleging that the 2004 dissociation was wrongful 
and that, prior to dissociation, Saint Alphonsus had breached its fiduciary duties to the 
partnership and breached the partnership agreement's covenant of good faith and fair dealing by 
allegedly assisting IM! and thereby causing Center and Mobile to lose business to IM!. (Id. pp. 
63-79.) On January 31, 2006, MRIA filed additional counterclaims against Saint Alphonsus, 
including claims for breach of the partnership agreement's non-compete clause, interference with 
prospective contractual relations or business expectations, and civil conspiracy, as well as a 
third-party complaint against SARG/GSR, !MI and one of their affiliates (all of whom settled 
withMRIApriortotrial). (Id. pp.141-78.) 
On July 24, 2006, in response to cross-motions for summary judgment, the court held that 
Saint Alphonsus's dissociation had been wrongful as a matter oflaw. (R., Vol. II, p. 396.) The 
court rejected Saint Alphonsus's argument that its dissociation was proper under the 1998 Idaho 
Revised Uniform Partnership Act ("RUPA"), which created-and made retroactive to all 
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existing partnerships-a right of all partners to dissociate absent an "express provision" limiting 
that right. In doing so, the court relied on Section 6.1 of the 1985 partnership agreement, which 
provides that "(a]ny Hospital Partner may withdraw ... if' it reasonably believes that "continued 
participation" in the partnership jeopardizes the Hospital Partner's tax exempt status or its ability 
to secure reimbursement, is contrary to ethical principles of the Catholic Church, or is in 
violation oflaw. (App. 4 (Trial Ex. 4023 § 6.1).) The court reasoned that this withdrawal right 
under the 1985 contract is synonymous with the right to dissociate subsequently created by 
RUPA in 1998, and that the parties intended the enumerated grounds for withdrawal (none of 
which was applicable here) to be exclusive. (R., Vol. II, pp. 394-95.) The court rejected the 
argument that Section 6.1-drafted before the RUP A-created power to dissociate even existed-
did not eliminate dissociation rights, holding that even "assuming ... that [Section 6.1] was an 
addition of rights under the U[niform] P[artnership] A[ct], [it] is clearly restrictive viewed in the 
context of the RUPA, which applies retroactively to all Idaho partnership agreements." (Id 
p. 394.) According to the court, Section 6.1 was thus an "express provision" making dissociation 
"wrongful" within the meaning ofRUPA. (/d) On Saint Alphonsus's motion for 
reconsideration, the court rejected the argument that RUP A retroactively created a new power to 
dissociate that was applicable to pre-RUP A partnership agreements. It held that the "decision to 
include section 6.1 in the Partnership Agreement is ... properly characterized as the replacement 
of a default provision," even though the RUP A provision allowing partners to dissociate without 
causing dissolution did not even exist at the time. (R., Vol. III, p. 54 l .) 
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On December 20, 2006, MRIA moved to add a claim for breach of fiduciary duty brought 
"on behalf of' limited partnerships Center and Mobile. (R., Vol. III, p. 586.) Saint Alphonsus 
opposed the filing of this counterclaim on the grounds that MRIA could not state a claim "on 
behalf of' the limited partnerships, which had the power to sue in their own names, and that 
Saint Alphonsus owed no fiduciary duties to those entities. (Exhibit to R. #57, pp. 4-5.) On 
February 6, 2007, the court allowed MRIA's new counterclaims, reasoning that MRIA had the 
authority to bring claims on behalf of the limited partnerships pursuant to the limited partnership 
agreements. (R., Vol. V, pp. 868-71.) Then, on June 13, 2007, the court denied Saint 
Alphonsus's motion for summary judgment on the fiduciary duty claim asserted on behalf of the 
limited partnerships. (R., Vol. X, p. 1880.) The court acknowledged that Saint Alphonsus owed 
no statutory fiduciary duties to Center or Mobile, but concluded that a question of fact remained 
whether a common-law fiduciary duty might exist based on the nature of the relationship 
between Saint Alphonsus and the limited partnerships. (Id pp. 1876-80.) The court ruled that 
this issue would be decided by the jury. (Id p. 1880.) 
As trial approached, both parties filed numerous motions in limine, three of which are 
relevant here. First, Saint Alphonsus moved to exclude, on the grounds of attorney-client 
privilege, portions of an internal memorandum (App. 32 (Trial Ex. 4239)) prepared by 
investment banking firm Shattuck Hammond. (R., Vol. VIII, pp. 1453-55; Confidential Exhibit 
to R. #4, at Ex. A.) Shattuck Hammond had been retained in 2001 by Givens Pursley, Saint 
Alphonsus's counsel, to assist in providing legal advice, and the memorandum summarized 
advice given to Saint Alphonsus by Givens Pursley regarding the "likely ... litigation" and "risk 
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of ... breaching" a fiduciary duty if Saint Alphonsus dissociated. (R., Vol. XI, p. 2184.) The 
court held that these statements were not privileged. (R., Vol. XI, pp.2116-18.) 
Second, Saint Alphonsus filed a motion in limine regarding MRIA's so-called "purchase 
price" damage theory. (R., Vol. VIII, pp. 1462-65.) Under this theory, MRIA claimed that 
recoverable damages for wrongful dissociation should be measured by the estimated value or 
hypothetical purchase price of Center. (R., Vol. IX, pp. 1694-97.) Saint Alphonsus argued that 
the value of Center-the price a purchaser would have had to pay to buy the whole business-
was not a proper measure of the diminution of Center's profits or value as a result of the 
dissociation. (Exhibit to R. #137, pp. 5-7.) The court initially filed an order appearing to grant 
Saint Alphonsus's motion (R., Vol. XI, pp. 2120-22), but after MRIA filed a "Request for 
Clarification," the court reversed itself and held that the purchase price evidence could be used if 
"further foundation [was] established" as to the 2001 valuation's "relevance and probative value 
as to damages or the value of the partnership." (R., Vol. XI, p. 2164.) 
Third, and finally, Saint Alphonsus moved that MRIA be "prohibit[ed] ... from asserting 
at trial that [Saint Alphonsus'] withdrawal was 'unlawful,' 'wrongful,' 'misconduct,' or 
otherwise contrary to law." (Exhibit to R. #136, pp. 2-3.) The court ruled that MRIA could refer 
to the dissociation as "wrongful" because that term was "technically and legally accurate," but 
could not argue that dissociation was "unlawful, ilJegal, or a violation of law" because such 
descriptions were "inflammatory" and created an "undeniable danger of unfair prejudice to Saint 
Alphonsus." (R., Vol. XI, p. 2123.) 
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On August 6, 2007, MRIA's counterclaims proceeded to trial on the issues of 
(1) damages from the already determined "wrongful" dissociation; (2) an alternative theory that 
the dissociation was wrongful because it occurred prior to expiration of a definite partnership 
term; (3) breach of the partnership agreement's non-compete clause; (4) breach of the 
partnership agreement's implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (5) interference with 
prospective contractual relations or business expectations; (6) breach of fiduciary duty to MRIA, 
Center, or Mobile; and (7) civil conspiracy. 
MRIA made the court's summary judgment ruling that Saint Alphonsus had wrongfully 
dissociated the centerpiece ofits case before the jury. MRIA first raised the topic during jury 
voir dire.3 In MRIA's opening statement to the jury, its counsel reminded the jury repeatedly of 
the court's ruling: . 
• "Now, the court has said that it has found that Saint Alphonsus wrongfully 
withdrew from the partnership ... it's been discussed during jury selection. It 
will be discussed in opening statement. You'll hear a lot about that." (Tr., Vol. I, 
p. 997, L. 21 to p. 99_8, L. 1.) 
• "'Wrongful withdrawal' is something that I want you to look for when I take you 
through the story of this case. Okay?" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 998, L. 19-20.) 
• "You recall the court has found that Saint Alphonsus wrongfully withdrew. Our 
experts will testify that the lost scans, as a result of wrongful withdrawal-
$29,500, 000." (Tr., Vol. I, p. 1044, L. 15-18.) 
3 MRIA's attorney told the venire panel that the case was "about a partnership that ultimately 
failed when Saint Alphonsus walked away from it. The court has determined in this case, 
already, that Saint Alphonsus wrongfully withdrew from this partnership in 2004." (Tr., Vol. I., 
p. 616, L. 12-17_; see also id. p. 922, L. 9-11 ("you're going to hear that Judge McLaughlin has 
entered an order that finds that St. Alphonsus breached its contract with MRI Associates").) 
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MRIA also emphasized this ruling during the testimony of several key witnesses, including its 
own experts. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 2734, L. 10-13; Tr., Vol. III, p. 2875, L. 4-9.) 
To address these repeated references to "wrongful" conduct, Saint Alphonsus attempted 
to argue, as suggested by the court's pretrial ruling (see supra p. 9), that hs dissociation was not 
"unlawful." (Tr., Vol. I, p. 620, L. 6-13.) However, the court forbid any such statements. (Tr., 
Vol. III, p. 3 960, L. 16 to p. 3 962, L. 1.) Saint Alphonsus also proposed jury instructions 
clarifying the meaning of "wrongful" as not necessarily implying misconduct (Exhibit to R. #230, 
Instr. 3), but that instruction was rejected. The court instead instructed the jury that "Saint 
Alphonsus breached [the MRIA partnership agreement] when it wrongfully withdrew from 
MRIA on April 1, 2004," and that it "ha[d] been determined by the court to be a wrongful 
dissociation." (Tr., Vol. III, p. 4271, L. IO top. 4275, L. 4; id p. 4283, L. 6-15.) MRIA 
emphasized these instructions and the court's ruling in closing argument: 
• "[W]e talked about three betrayals. And the first one, really, the simplest in that 
it's the wrongful dissociation. Okay? And I've got some good news, and I've got 
some bad news for you. The good news is that you don't have to worry about 
liability on wrongful dissociation. Okay? The bad news is that if you don't like 
that decision, there isn't anything you can do about it. That's the court's order. 
The court looked at the evidence. The court looked at the contract. The court 
looked at the testimony of the witnesses and concluded as a matter of law that 
there was a breach of the contract. That's it." (Tr., Vol. III, p. 4310, L. 1-12.) 
• "Let me show you [Jury] Instruction 39 ... what I want you to focus on-we can 
read through this. 'The court has determined that Saint Alphonsus has dissociated, 
and it was wrongful."' (Tr., Vol. III, p. 4381, L. 17-21.) 
• "[Y]ou were told [Saint Alphonsus] wrongful[ly] dissociated .... " (Tr., Vol. III, 
p. 4385, L. 20-21.) 
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In addition to focusing on the court's holding that Saint Alphonsus had acted wrongfully, 
MRJA's counsel during trial repeatedly relied on the privileged communications memorialized in 
the Shattuck Hammond memorandum-which counsel characterized as one of "the most critical 
documents in the case" (Tr., Vol. III, p. 4302, L. 20)-to argue that Saint Alphonsus and its 
officers had acted in bad faith and with indifference to their lawyers' advice about Saint 
Alphonsus's legal obligations to MRJA. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol. II, p. 1861, L. 21 top. 1866, L. I; 
id. p. 1874, L. 13 top. 1878, L. 16; Tr., Vol. III, p. 3593, L. 22 top. 3596, L. 8; id. p. 4302, L. 
7-23; id. p. 4317, L. I 0-19; id. p. 4321, L. 10-18.) MRIA also introduced, over Saint 
Alphonsus's objection (Tr., Vol. II, p. 1239, L. 9 top. 1246, L. 24), a settlement offer that had 
been proffered by MRIA and rejected by Saint Alphonsus. (See App. 4 (Trial Ex. 4332).) 
MRJA told the jury that Saint Alphonsus's rejection of this settlement offer was a "telltale" sign 
of Saint Alphonsus's alleged bad faith. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 4322, L. 1-15; see also id. p. 4296, L. 
11-20; id. p. 4390, L. 9-14.) 
With respect to damages, MRIA was allowed to present alternative theories to the jury. 
The first, the "lost scan" theory, focused exclusively on the number of MRI scans that were 
allegedly "diverted" from Center or Mobile to IMI. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 2741, L. 7 top. 2753, L. 7.) 
The second was the "purchase price" damage theory (see supra p. 9), which the district court 
allowed to be introduced over Saint Alphonsus's objection. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 2887, L. 10 to 
p. 2892, L. 4.) This theory was explicitly presented to the jury as the measure of damages 
resulting from the wrongful dissociation, while the "lost scan" theory was presented as 
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measuring damages on all other claims. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 2887, L. 10 top. 2892, L. 4; see also id. 
p. 4310, L. 15 top. 4312, L. 4; id. p. 4383, L. 9-16.) 
The jury was given several disputed instructions. First, in connection with the claims for 
breach of fiduciary duty, Saint Alphonsus proposed instructions that would have distinguished 
between the statutory duties owed by Saint Alphonsus to MRIA as one of its general partners, 
and the separate common-Jaw fiduciary duty, if any, owed to the limited partnerships, Center and 
Mobile. (Exhibit to R. #231, Instrs. 29-30 & Special Verdict Question 12.) The district court 
denied this request, and instead gave a combined jury instruction on fiduciary duty that made no 
distinction between MRIA and the limited partnerships, and stated that "[a] fiduciary is a person 
or entity with a duty to act primarily for the benefit of another." (Tr., Vol. III, p. 4281, L. 21 to 
p. 4822, L. 4.) 
Rather than submit to the jury the question whether Saint Alphonsus owed any fiduciary 
duties to the limited partnerships, as the court had earlier stated it would (see supra p. 8), the 
district court instructed the jury that Saint Alphonsus owed a fiduciary duty to the limited 
partnerships (Tr., Vol. III, p. 4281, L. 21 top. 4822, L. 4), later stating that there was no 
reasonable basis on which the jury could doubt that conclusion (R., Vol. XIII, p. 2442-43). The 
court submitted only the single question whether Saint Alphonsus had breached a fiduciary duty 
owed to MRIA, Center "or" Mobile (Tr., Vol. III, p. 4281, L. 21 top. 4822, L. 4), and provided 
the jury with a verdict form that allowed no alternative but to award any damages to "MRIA" 
rather than to the limited partnerships (Exhibit to R. #202, Instr. 44, Question 11 ). 
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The jury, after deliberating for approximately ninety minutes, returned a verdict for 
MRIA on all of the counterclaims, awarding damages in the amount of$63.5 million. (R., 
Vol. XII, pp. 2293-96.) After determining that the jury had improperly cumulated MRIA's two 
alternative damages theories, as MRIA conceded, the court issued a remittitur, reducing the 
verdict to $36.3 million. (R., Vol. XIII, p. 2435.) Sitting in equity, the court also determined 
that Saint Alphonsus's interest in the partnership was $4.6 million, and ordered that amount 
offset from MRIA's award. (R., Vol. XII, p. 231 l.) The court also concluded that MRIA's 
claims arose out ofa "commercial transaction" within the meaning ofldaho Code§ 12-120(3) 
and accordingly awarded MRIA attorney fees and costs of $2.1 million (R., Vol. XIII, pp. 2448-
49, 2519-20), resulting in a final judgment for MRIA of$33,872,677.63 (R., Vol. XIII, p. 2534). 
On October 3, 2007, Saint Alphonsus moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
and for a new trial, arguing that the errors described above, among others, required the court to 
set aside the jury's verdict. (Exhibit to R. #208.) The district court denied the motions (R., Vol. 
XIII, pp. 2426-52), and this appeal followed. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court err in holding, as a matter of law, that a section of a 1985 
partnership agreement is an "express provision" prohibiting a partner from exercising a 
retroactively applicable power to dissociate that was created in 1998, where the contractual 
language does not mention "dissociation" or affirmatively prohibit anything? 
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2. Did the district court's ruling that Saint Alphonsus had wrongfully dissociated, 
which the court and opposing counsel repeatedly emphasized to the jury throughout the trial, so 
prejudice the jury's assessment on the remaining issues as to require a new trial? 
3. Did the district court err in allowing the jury to decide whether the 1985 
partnership was for a definite term of years, where a section of the partnership agreement entitled 
"Effective Date and Term" defined the term in a way that made it indefinite? 
4. Did the district court prejudicially err in allowing MRIA to show the jury a 
memorandum containing legal advice from Saint Alphonsus's attorneys, and a settlement offer 
expressly marked as a "Confidential Settlement Offer Made Pursuant to l.R.E. 408," in order to 
establish that Saint Alphonsus acted in bad faith? 
5. Must the damage award to MRIA of$36.3 million in lost scan profits be reversed 
because: 
a. MRIA, as the general partner of the limited partnerships, itself provided 
no scanning services, and any alleged lost scan profits belonged to the limited partnerships, 
Center and Mobile? 
b. This award cannot be upheld on the ground that it was actually an award 
to Center and/or Mobile, given that the jury did not determine whether Saint Alphonsus was 
liable to the limited partnerships, and, in any event, Saint Alphonsus owed them no fiduciary 
duty as a matter of law? 
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c. MRIA offered no evidence to prove that Saint Alphonsus actually caused 
all or any specific portion of the changes in patient referrals upon which the damage award 
depends? 
d. The damage award includes $6.0 million for the period 2015 to 2023, 
based on a factually unsupported assertion that the term of the Center limited partnership 
agreement had been extended for that period? 
6. Was MRIA's alternative theory of damages, based on the hypothetical full value 
of the Center limited partnership in 2001, a legally and factually improper measure of"benefit of 
the bargain" damages for the alleged wrongful dissociation from the MRIA partnership? 
7. Given the district court's conclusion that MRIA's claims arose from a commercial 
transaction, is Saint Alphonsus entitled to an award of attorneys fees both on appeal and at trial 
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-120(3)? 
ARGUMENT 
I. SAINT ALPHONSUS'S DISSOCIATION FROM MRIA DID NOT BREACH THE 
PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT, AND THE DISTRICT COURT'S ERRONEOUS 
GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO THE CONTRARY PREJUDICED THE 
ENTIRE TRIAL 
A. The District Court Incorrectly Ruled That Saint Alphonsus Had Dissociated 
In Violation Of An Express Provision Of The Partnership Agreement 
The district court erred when it granted summary judgment for MRIA on its claim that 
Saint Alphonsus breached the MRIA partnership agreement by dissociating from MRIA in 2004. 
The court made this ruling notwithstanding the fact that Idaho's Revised Uniform Partnership 
Act, enacted in 1998, created a new general power of partners to dissociate without causing 
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dissolution of the partnership, Idaho Code § 53-3-602(a), and made that power retroactively 
applicable to all existing partnerships, id § 53-3-l 204(b ). The court reasoned that this 1998 
power to dissociate was limited by an "express provision" of the 1985 agreement and that the 
dissociation was thus "wrongful" under Idaho Code§ 53-3-602(b)(l). In so holding, the district 
court misunderstood both the impact ofRUPA's retroactive changes to the background rules 
governing Idaho partnerships, and the sort of "express provision" necessary to render "wrongful" 
the exercise ofRUPA's later-granted statutory rights.4 
1. The Revised Uniform Partnership Act Fundamentally Altered Idaho 
Law By Retroactively Allowing All Partners To Dissociate Without 
Causing Dissolution Of The Partnership, And Letting Partnerships 
Adopt An "Express Provision" Of The Partnership Agreement 
Making Such Dissociation A Breach Of Contract 
In I 998, the Idaho legislature adopted RUP A and, effective July l, 200 l, retroactively 
applied it to "all partnerships" existing at the time of enactment. Idaho Code § 53-3- l 204(b ). As 
this Court recently noted, "RUP A dramatically change[ d] [the] aspect of partnership law" 
dealing with the essential legal structure of the partnership and the consequences of a partner's 
departure. Costa v. Borges, 145 Idaho 353, l 79 P.3d 316, 319-20 (2008). Before RUPA, under 
the Uniform Partnership Act ("UP A"), partnerships were entities defined by the particular 
aggregation of individual partners. See id; Idaho Code§§ 53-329, -330, -33 l (repealed effective 
July 1, 2001 ); Paul Powell, Comment, Dissociating the Fiduciary: Duty Revisions and the 
Resulting Confusion in Idaho's New Partnership Law, 36 Idaho L. Rev. 145, 147 & n. l 4 (l 999). 
4 As explained below in Part LC, the district court also erred in allowing the jury to consider 
MRJA's alternative theory that Saint Alphonsus wrongfully dissociated in violation of a definite 
term of years. 
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As a result, a single partner's departure caused the original legal entity to dissolve, even where 
such departure violated a provision of the contract (in which event the departure and resulting 
dissolution would be remediable in damages). See Idaho Code§ 53-33l(l)(b), (2) (repealed 
effective July I, 2001) ("Dissolution is caused [either consistent with the partnership agreement 
or in contravention of it] by the express will of any partner at any time."). 
The drafters of RUPA deemed this state of affairs intolerable, because the UP A rule "that 
a partnership is dissolved every time a member leaves" "fail[ ed] to recognize the stability of 
many partnerships." Donald J. Weidner & John W. Larson, The Revised Uniform Partnership 
Act: The Reporters' Overview, 49 Bus. Law. 1, 5 (1993). Thus, to enhance the legal and 
practical continuity of partnerships, RUPA provides that "[a] partnership is an entity distinct 
from its partners," Idaho Code§ 53-3-201, and that every "partner can be dissociated from a 
partnership without causing the dissolution of the partnership or requiring the winding up of its 
affairs." Costa, 179 P.3d at 320; see also Larry E. Ribstein, The Revised Uniform Partnership 
Act: Not Ready For Prime Time, 49 Bus. Law. 45, 62 (1993) ("The UPA provides that any 
partner dissociation causes dissolution .... RUPA Articles 6, 7, and 8 appear to change this by 
clearly separating partner dissociation and dissolution .... "). 
Because the ability of partners to dissociate without causing dissolution of a partnership 
was essential to the RUPA drafters' concept of partnerships as continuous entities transcending 
the make-up of their members, that power is enshrined in§ 53-3-103(b)(6) as one of the ten basic 
features of a partnership that cannot be altered by agreement of the partners. See id ("[t]he 
partnership agreement may not: ... [v]ary the power to dissociate as a partner under section 53-
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3-602(a), Idaho Code, except to require [written notice of dissociation]"). This fundamental 
change in partnership law, which allowed any partner to leave the partnership without causing it 
to dissolve, effectively amended all existing partnership agreements and altered the expectations 
of the parties as they existed at the time of execution. After RUPA's effective date, any partner 
could dissociate simply by giving notice to the partnership of that partner's "express will" to do 
so. Id.§§ 53-3-601(1), -602(a). 
At the same time, though, RUP A allows partners to agree that such a dissociation would 
be "wrongful" by, among other things, including an "express provision of the partnership 
agreement" making dissociation a breach of contract. Id. § 53-3-602(b ). RUP A thus created a 
legal framework in which partners could come and go at will from a continuing partnership 
entity, while providing that"[ a] partner who wrongfully dissociates [in breach of an express 
provision of the agreement] is liable to the partnership and to the other partners for damages 
caused by the dissociation." Id. § 53-3-602(c). 
There is no dispute among the parties or the district court that these RUP A provisions, 
which revolutionized the nature and continuity of partnerships, were made retroactively 
applicable to all existing partnerships, including MRIA, notwithstanding that its partnership 
agreement was executed in 1985 and Idaho's RUPA was not enacted until 1998. Id. § 53-3-
1204(b). The statute's retroactive application only became effective, however, after "a transition 
period [ending July 1, 2001] .... [t]hat afford[ed] existing partnerships and partners an 
opportunity to consider the changes effected by RUPA and to amend their partnership 
agreements, if appropriate." Idaho Code§ 53-3-1204, official cmt. 
- 19 -
2. Section 6.1 Of The 1985 Partnership Agreement Is Not An "Express 
Provision" That Makes Wrongful Any Exercise Of The Power To 
Dissociate Conferred By RUPA In 1998 
The district court concluded that Saint Alphonsus's dissociation violated an "express 
provision" of the partnership agreement, namely Section 6.1. That provision states: 
6.1 Conditions for Withdrawal. Any Hospital Partner may 
withdraw from the Partnership at any time if, in a Hospital 
Partner's reasonable judgment, continued participation in this 
partnership: (i) jeopardizes the tax-exempt status of such Hospital 
Partner or its parent or its subsidiaries; or (ii) jeopardizes 
Medicare/Medicaid or insurance reimbursements or participations; 
(iii) if the business activities of the Partnership are contrary to the 
ethical principles of the Roman Catholic Church as designated 
from time to time; or (iv) is or may be in violation of any local, 
state or federal laws, rules or regulations. 
(App. 4 (Trial Ex. 4023 § 6.1).)5 The district court reasoned that this section's "may 
withdraw ... if' language necessarily reflected an expectation that withdrawal would be limited 
to the four enumerated circumstances, and that Section 6.1 is therefore an "express provision" 
making Saint Alphonsus's dissociation under RUPA a breach of contract. (R., Vol. ll, pp. 394-
95.) This is wrong. 
An "express" provision is one that is "' [ c ]!ear; definite; explicit; plain; direct; 
unmistakable; not dubious or ambiguous. Declared in terms; set forth in words. Directly and 
distinctly stated. Made known distinctly and explicitly, and not left to inference.'" Sweeney v. 
Otter, 119 Idaho 135,140,804 P.2d 308,313 (1990) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 
1990)); see also V Oxford English Dictionary 582 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "express," when 
5 The agreement defines "Hospital Partner" as including Saint Alphonsus and the other 
hospitals, but not DMR. (App. 2 (Trial Ex. 4023 § 1.3.3).) 
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referring to a "meaning, purpose, stipulation, law, etc." as one that is "not merely implied; 
definitively formulated; definite, [or] explicit"). An "express provision" making it a breach of 
contract to exercise the RUPA-conferred power to dissociate without causing dissolution must 
therefore do so affirmatively and unambiguously, without resort to inferences or speculation 
about what the parties might have intended. 
Section 6. l is not such an "express provision" because it says nothing at all about the 
parties' intentions regarding the RUPA power to dissociate without causing dissolution. Most 
fundamentally, Section 6. l does not mention or address "dissociation" at all. How could it, since 
the power to dissociate without causing dissolution of the partnership was an entirely new 
concept that did not exist when Section 6.1 was written in 1985? That power was created by 
RUP A in l 998 and made retroactively applicable to existing partnerships in 2001. Without a 
crystal ball to foretell RUPA's change in the law, there is no way that the parties in I 985 could 
have included a provision addressing whether exercise of the RUP A power to dissociate while 
leaving the partnership intact was or was not a breach of contract. 
In addition, the language of Section 6.1 is entirely permissive. It provides that a hospital 
partner "may withdraw" under certain conditions, but does not expressly limit or restrict anything. 
It certainly does not, as the district court effectively held, expressly reject any and all subsequent 
legislative modifications of a partner's right to leave the partnership. 
Beyond the fact that Section 6.1 is not an "express" limitation of any sort, it also does not 
support any inference about how the parties would have regarded the new RUP A power to 
dissociate without dissolving the existing partnership, had they somehow thought to consider it 
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in 1985. That is because Section 6.1 was adopted against a UPA background rule that did not 
contain any notion of partnership "withdrawal." Rather, under UPA, a single partner's decision 
to leave the partnership would cause its dissolution. In that context, Section 6.1 was solely an 
affirmative grant to the hospital partners of a contractual right to "withdraw" for specified urgent 
reasons relating to the hospital partners' legal and ethical duties. That provision was coupled 
with provisions in Sections 6.2 and 6.3 that would avoid a forced liquidation of partnership 
assets, provide a defined and limited payout of the withdrawing partner's interests, and facilitate 
continued operation of the business. (See Exhibit to R. #8, pp. 8-9; Exhibit to R. # 15, pp. 5-7; 
Exhibit to R. #23, pp. 4-9.) Section 6.1, in other words, was included as a safety valve to provide 
a contractual mechanism to meet the parties' needs within the legal framework as it existed in 
1985. The provision's permissive "may withdraw ... if' language is thus an assurance to the 
hospitals of minimum withdrawal rights that were essential to them. It says nothing about how 
the parties would regard rights granted by a future law to dissociate without causing dissolution.6 
6 The district court's error in reading this pre-existing contractual provision as an "express" 
limitation of the subsequently enacted RUP A right is illustrated by cases from other jurisdictions 
that have adopted RUP A. In Warnick v. Warnick, 76 P.3d 316 (Wyo. 2003), for example, the 
court addressed an agreement that contained express terms governing liquidation of the 
partnership, but-since the concept did not exist when the agreement was made-was "silent as 
to dissociation." Id at 318, 322. Explaining that "RUP A dramatically change[ d] the law 
governing partnership breakups and dissolution" by creating an "entirely new concept, 
'dissociation,"' id at 321 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), the court concluded 
that a partner's expression of his desire to withdraw from the partnership was governed by 
RUPA's default provisions for the buyout of a dissociating partner, rather than by the 
agreement's express provisions for liquidation. Id at 322. 
Similarly, in McCormick v. Brevig, 96 P.3d 697 (Mont. 2004), a partner in a UP A-era 
partnership sought to rely on UP A-era case law in an effort to obtain a buyout in lieu of 
liquidation following a judicial dissolution of the partnership. Id at 703-05. The court rejected 
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The conclusion that Section 6.1 is not an "express provision" limiting RUPA's general 
right of dissociation is even clearer when one considers the rights granted by RUP A to DMR, the 
consortium of doctors that partnered with the hospitals to form MRIA. As a safety valve 
responsive to the unique needs of Saint Alphonsus and the other hospitals, Section 6.1, by its 
terms, applies only to the "Hospital Partner[s]," and not to DMR. Indeed, Section 6.1 says 
nothing at all about DMR. Thus: (i) when the partnership was first formed, DMR had no ability 
to withdraw or otherwise leave the partnership without causing its dissolution; (ii) effective July 
1, 200 I, RUPA retroactively gave DMR the power to dissociate while leaving the partnership 
intact; and (iii) Section 6.1 obviously does not restrict DMR 's RUPA-granted ability to dissociate 
in the way the district court held that Saint Alphonsus's dissociation rights were limited. But 
Section 6.1 was written as an unambiguous grant to the hospital partners of more favorable 
withdrawal rights than were given to their partner DMR, and imposed no limitation at all. To 
now read Section 6.1 as giving the hospital partners a less favorable right to dissociate than 
DMR now has under RUP A is incongruous and contrary to anything the parties ever intended. It 
is easily avoided by recognizing that RUPA gave all partners the power to dissociate without 
causing dissolution, and no amendment to the agreement-no "express provision"-was ever 
adopted to make its exercise a breach of contract under any circumstance. 
(continued ... ) 
these cases, however, because "[ u ]nlike the UP A, RUPA now provides two separate tracks for 
the exiting partner"---dissociation and dissolution-and specifically requires liquidation in cases 
of dissolution by judicial decree. Id. The court thus applied the new legal framework created by 
RUPA to a preexisting partnership, even though the consequence was to alter the outcome that 
would have been contemplated by the parties when the partnership agreement was executed. 
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In holding otherwise, the district court reasoned that, when the partnership agreement was 
signed, the parties did not expect that Saint Alphonsus and the other hospitals would be able to 
withdraw from the partnership except for the reasons enumerated in Section 6.1. (Neither, of 
course, did they believe DMR had any withdrawal rights.) But these facts are beside the point, 
precisely because RUP A made retroactive its fundamental changes in partnership law and thus 
effectively amended the 1985 agreement contract and altered the expectations of the parties. 
Indeed, RUPA's retroactive change in the nature of partnerships was made with full knowledge 
that "[i]n a number of key areas, the Revised Act contains substantive changes in partnership law 
that directly undo the historical bargains incorporated into existing partnership agreements." 
Allan W. Vestal, Should the Revised Uniform Partnership Act of I 994 Really Be Retroactive?, 
50 Bus. Law. 267,274 (I 994). "Because ofth[is] retroactive application," it was understood that 
a party could be "left with a set of partnership termination provisions far different from those 
upon which he counted at the inception of the partnership," including a right to "dissociate from 
the partnership--a concept and term new to partnership law." Allan W. Vestal, "Wide Open": 
Nevada's Innovative Market in Partnership Law, 35 Hofstra L. Rev. 275, 278 (2006). 
The legislature chose to account for these effects not by giving courts the power to 
mitigate them by finding "express provisions" where there are none, but rather by providing the 
parties to existing partnerships with a three-year grace period during which they could amend 
their agreements to adjust to some of these changes, including by expressly making specified 
acts of dissociation an actionable breach of contract. See Idaho Code§ 53-3-1204(b)-(c); supra 
p. 19. Critically, however, the MRIA partners let this opportunity pass, and have adopted no 
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amendments to limit or qualify any of the new rules RUPA retroactively made applicable to 
MRIA. In particular, they never amended their agreement to provide that a partner's exercise of 
the newly created power to dissociate without causing dissolution would constitute a breach of 
contract. 
In sum, the Idaho legislature conferred on all partners in existing partnerships a power to 
dissociate without causing dissolution, and, at the same time, allowed such partnerships to adopt 
an "express provision" making such dissociation a breach of contract. The court below erred in 
concluding that Section 6.1 of the 1985 agreement is such a provision. It should instead have 
held that no such express provision exists and accordingly entered summary judgment for Saint 
Alphonsus on MRIA's claim for wrongful dissociation.7 
B. Communication To The Jury Of The Court's Erroneous Summary 
Judgment Ruling Prejudiced The Jury's Consideration Of The Entire Case 
The district court's erroneous holding on summary judgment that Saint Alphonsus 
"wrongfully" dissociated from the partnership, coupled with its subsequent denial of Saint 
Alphonsus's motions to prohibit MRIA from referring to that holding during trial or otherwise to 
clarify the holding's import, prevented Saint Alphonsus from having a fair trial on MRIA's other 
claims. These rulings enabled MRIA's counsel to repeatedly trumpet to the jury-as the 
centerpiece ofMRIA's case-the court's pre-trial ruling binding the jury to the conclusion that 
Saint Alphonsus had acted "wrongfully" towards MRIA. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol. I, p. 616, L. 15-17; 
id. p. 922, L. 9-24; id. p. 997, L. 21 top. 998, L. 1; id. p. 998, L. 19-21; id. p. 1044, L. 15-18; Tr., 
7 Even if there were ambiguity about the meaning of Section 6. 1, the court should have 
submitted this question to the jury rather than decided it in favor of MRIA on summary judgment. 
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Vol. III, p. 4310, L. 1-12.) This made it impossible from the very beginning of the trial for the 
jury to fairly and impartially consider MRIA's remaining claims. The court's instructions to the 
jury that Saint Alphonsus's dissociation was wrongful also amounted to a directed verdict on 
critical elements of the remaining claims, and thus all but eliminated the possibility of verdicts 
for Saint Alphonsus on these other claims. This crippling prejudice requires the remaining 
verdicts to be set aside and a new trial granted. 
Rule 59(a) of the Idabo Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the grant of a new trial 
based on any "[i]rregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party or any order of 
the court or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial" or 
an "[e]rror in law, occurring at the trial." l.R.C.P. 59(a)(l), (7). This is true regardless of the 
court's view of the likelihood ofa different outcome upon retrial, so long as any party was 
"deprived ... of a fair trial." Cook v. Skyline Corp., 135 Idaho 26, 32, 13 P.3d 857, 863 (2000); 
see also Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 262, 805 P.2d 452, 468 (1991 ). Moreover, "where 
prejudicial errors oflaw have occurred at the trial," the court has a "duty to grant a new trial" 
even if"the verdict is supported by substantial evidence." Davis v. Sun Valley Ski Educ. Found, 
Inc., 130 Idaho 400,405,941 P.2d 1301, 1306 (1997) (emphasis added; citation and quotation 
marks omitted); accord 11 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2805 
(2d ed. 1995) ("[aJny error oflaw, if prejudicial, is a good ground for a new trial"). The test for 
prejudice requiring a new trial is "whether the [improperly admitted] information reasonably 
could have produced prejudice, when evaluated in light of all the events and evidence at trial." 
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Dach/et v. State, 136 ldaho 752, 760, 40 P.3d 110, 118 (2002) (emphasis added; citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
The test for prejudice under Rule 59(a) is met here. As a general matter, the 
communication to the jury of an incorrect summary-judgment ruling on one theory of liability 
obviously has the potential to result in severe prejudice as to claims tried to the jury. The case of 
Steele v. Kelley, 710 N.E.2d 973 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999), is instructive. In Steele, the trial court 
had erroneously failed to dismiss one of the plaintiff's claims, on which the jury subsequently 
found liability. See id at 984-85. This error, of course, required the appellate court to order 
judgment for the defendant on that specific claim. But "[t]he impact of the judge's error with 
respect to th[at] count was not confined ... to an improper resolution of that discrete claim." Id 
at 985. Rather, "by focusing the jury's attention on" issues that should not have been before it, 
the improper submission of the claim "effectively tainted the whole case against [the 
defendant]." Id Not only that, but the "taint of this fundamental error over the entire proceeding 
was spread by [the plaintiff's] attorney," who focused on the improper claim in her closing 
argument, and the "contamination" was made "decisive" by "the judge's charge" to the jury to 
focus on the elements of that claim. Id The legal error with respect to the one cause of action 
therefore ''.justifies reversal of the entire judgment ... and the allowance of a new trial." Id; 
accord 2200 Commercial St. Warehousing, L.L.C. v. Hastings Dev. Co., 255 S.W.3d 488,490 
(Ark. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that "erroneous grant of summary judgment" on certain claims 
"tainted" the findings made at subsequent trial and therefore required a new trial). 
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Here, even more clearly than in Steele, the district court's legal error in concluding that 
Saint Alphonsus had "wrongfully" dissociated-along with MRIA's opportunistic use of that 
error to bias the jury against Saint Alphonsus--created prejudice requiring a new trial on all 
other claims. Unlike the error in Steele, which simply allowed an invalid claim to be heard by 
the jury, the district court in this case informed the jury that the defendant was liable on a 
meritless claim. Indeed, the court's holding was the very heart ofMRIA's trial strategy on its 
remaining claims, pursuant to which MRIA sought to portray Saint Alphonsus as a court-
adjudicated wrongdoer and Saint Alphonsus's "wrongful" dissociation as the culmination of a 
scheme, begun years earlier, to "betray" MRIA. See supra pp. 10-11. This strategy began with 
voir dire, continued through MRIA's opening statement, infected the testimony of key witnesses, 
and culminated in counsel's closing argument. See supra pp. 10-11. These mischaracterizations 
were backed by the authority of the district court, which not only instructed the jury that it had 
already determined that Saint Alphonsus had dissociated "wrongfully" (Tr., Vol. III, p. 4271, L. 
4-11), but also denied Saint Alphonsus's request to explain to the jury that a "wrongful 
dissociation" is not necessarily illegal or blameworthy, see Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., Inc., 
841 F.2d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[e]ven if the breach is deliberate, it is not necessarily 
blameworthy"). (Tr., Vol. III, pp. 3960-62.) 
The message that Saint Alphonsus was an adjudicated wrongdoer also made it possible 
for MRIA to discredit testimony that Saint Alphonsus had dealt with MRIA in good faith and 
had made generous concessions to MRIA when it attempted to negotiate a deal that would have 
involved MRIA in the operations of!MI or otherwise resolved the parties' impasse. (See, e.g., 
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Tr., Vol. III, p. 3809, L. 17 top. 3822, L. 4; id. p. 4014, L. 15 top. 4026, L. 11.) Having already 
been told that Saint Alphonsus had no right to leave the partnership, the jury quite naturally 
accepted MRIA's competing characterization of these negotiations as a bad-faith sham. (See, 
e.g., Tr., Vol. III, p. 4307, L. 2-23; id. p. 4321, L. 10-25.) MRIA also used the court's holding to 
undermine the general credibility of Saint Alphonsus' s witnesses, such as CEO Sandra Bruce, 
whom it mocked in closing argument on the ground that she "thought lt was okay" for Saint 
Alphonsus to withdraw from the partnership. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol. III, p. 4317, L. 10-19.)8 
As a result, for the jury, the question of liability on MRIA 's other claims was never more 
than an afterthought. This alone requires a new trial, but there is even more prejudice here. In 
light of the admonition that Saint Alphonsus had "wrongfully" breached the partnership 
agreement, the court's instructions on those other claims were effectively tautological and 
virtually compelled the jury to find liability. Specifically: 
• On MRIA 's claim for wrongful dissociation in breach of a partnership term, the 
jury was asked to find whether Saint Alphonsus had "breached" the partnership 
agreement "by dissociating" before the end of the alleged partnership term (Tr., 
Vol. III, p. 4275), after having already been told that the court had already 
determined that the dissociation was wrongful and a breach. 
• On MRIA's claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the 
jury was instructed that Saint Alphonsus was liable if "[a]ction by Saint 
Alphonsus violated ... the contract." (Tr., Vol. III, p. 4278, L. 1-14.) Obviously, 
no reasonable juror could think that a dissociation that was a "wrongful" breach 
of the partnership agreement did not also "violat[ e] ... the contract." 
8 This trial tactic was especially effective because MRIA also relied on erroneously admitted 
privileged legal advice to argue that counsel had advised Saint Alphonsus beforehand that 
withdrawal was wrongful. See infra Part II.A. 
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• In connection with MRIA's claim for breach of the partnership agreement's non-
compete clause, MRIA's counsel and witnesses told the jury that Saint 
Alphonsus's wrongful dissociation necessarily gave rise to a breach of that clause. 
(See Tr., Vol. II, p. 1875, L. 11-14 ("if withdrawal is wrongful, then Saint 
Alphonsus cannot compete"); id p. 2221, L. 24 to p. 2222, L. 1 ("[iJf you 
withdraw wrongfully, my understanding is that your noncompete [obligation] 
would be for the period of the Partnership Agreement").) 
• On the claims for breach of fiduciary duty, the jury was instructed that Saint 
Alphonsus was liable if it failed "to act primarily for the benefie' of MRIA and 
the limited partnerships or if it "act[ed] adversely to the partnership." (Tr., Vol. 
III, p. 4281, L. 21 top. 4283, L. 10.) A party who willfully breached the contract 
by its withdrawal would obviously violate these standards as well. Indeed, 
MRIA's counsel argued that legal advice given to Saint Alphonsus gave it 
advance notice of that fact. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 3594, L. 9 top. 3596, L. 3; see also 
Tr., Vol. II, p. I 876, L. 13-16.) 
• On MRIA's claim for civil conspiracy, the jury was instructed to find liability if 
Saint Alphonsus had agreed "[t]o accomplish an 'unlawful' objective or 
accomplish a lawful objective through 'unlawful means,"' and was told that the 
"essence" of a civil conspiracy is a "civil wrong." (Tr., Vol. III, p. 4283, L. 16 to 
p. 4284, L. 11.) Without Saint Alphonsus being allowed to explain that 
"wrongful" dissociation was not equivalent to an "unlawful" act, the jury had the 
court's ruling as proof of this element of civil conspiracy. Indeed, the jury would 
plainly understand a ''wrongful" dissociation to be a civil "wrong." 
• On MRIA's claim that Saint Alphonsus tortiously interfered with prospective 
contractual relations, the jury was instructed to find Saint Alphonsus liable if the 
interference was "wrongful." (Tr., Vol. III, p. 4280, L. 11 top. 4281, L. 1 l.) Of 
course, the jury had already been reminded over and over again that Saint 
Alphonsus' s dissociation--one of the acts allegedly interfering with MRIA' s 
prospective relations-had already been held to be "wrongful." 
In short, on each one of the remaining claims, the jury was led to believe that the court's 
prior ruling on wrongful dissociation was a sufficient predicate for finding liability. Indeed, the 
fact that the jury returned a verdict for MRIA on each one of its claims in this complex case in 
just ninety minutes demonstrates the prejudicial sway that the court's ruling on wrongful 
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dissociation held over the jury. Because that ruling was incorrect as a matter of law, Saint 
Alphonsus is entitled to a new trial on all of MRIA' s other claims. 
C. The Grant Of Summary Judgment Cannot Be Justified On The Alternative 
Ground That Saint Alphonsus Dissociated Before The Expiration Of A 
Definite Term Of Years 
A partner's exercise of its RUPA power to dissociate without causing dissolution is 
wrongful not only if it is in breach of an express provision of the partnership agreement, but also 
if the partnership is "for a definite term," and the dissociation occurs "before the expiration of 
the term." Idaho Code§ 53-3-602(b)(2).9 MRIA claimed that the partnership agreement here 
was for a definite term, but cited no provision of the agreement to support that assertion. Instead, 
MRIA argued that other agreements between different entities-Center's and Mobile's limited 
partnership agreements and Center's September 1985 building lease-had fixed terms and raised 
an issue of fact whether the MRIA partnership agreement also had a fixed term. (Exhibit to R. 
#11, pp. 14-15; R., Vol. XII p. 2390-91.) Submitting this issue to the jury was error. 10 The 
MRIA partnership agreement, in a section entitled "Effective Date and Term," expressly 
addresses the term of the partnership in a manner that, as a matter of law, renders the term 
indefinite. The parol evidence rule bars admission of extrinsic evidence to modify this provision. 
"To find that [a] partnership is formed for a definite term ... there must be clear evidence 
of an agreement among the partners that the partnership ... has a minimum or maximum 
9 Dissociation is also wrongful if the partnership is for a "particular undertaking" and the 
dissociation occurs before the undertaking is complete, id., but such a theory was not submitted 
to the jury in this case. · 
10 Saint Alphonsus unsuccessfully moved for both summary judgment (Exhibit to R. #8, pp. 
14-16) and judgment notwithstanding the verdict (Exhibit to R. # 208, pp. 31-33) on this issue. 
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duration .... " Idaho Code§ 53-3-101 cmt. In contrast, a partnership has an indefinite term if 
the parties agree that the partnership will continue until an uncertain future date, i.e., if they 
"have not agreed to remain partners until the expiration ofa definite term." Id. § 53-3-101(10). 
Such a partnership that "may last indefinitely" is for an indefinite term, moreover, "even though 
there may be an obligation of the partnership, such as a mortgage, which must be repaid by a 
certain date, absent a specific agreement that no partner can rightfully withdraw until the 
obligation is repaid." Id. § 53-3-101 cmt. 
Applying these principles, courts have consistently focused on express contractual 
language and concluded, for example, that a partnership is for an indefinite term as a matter of 
law where the partnership agreement provided that the partnership "shall continue until dissolved 
either by mutual agreement or by operation of law," Courdy v. Paycom Billing Servs., Inc., 
No. B162421, 2006 WL 847212, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2006), or where the agreement 
provided that a partnership to operate a parcel of real property shall "continue until the real 
property is sold," Harshman v. Pantaleoni, 741 N.Y.S.2d 348,349 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002). In an 
analogous context, this Court, too, has recognized that a contract is not for "a definite term of 
duration" where it provides for contractual obligations to continue "as long as" certain 
circumstances exist. Gen. Auto Parts Co. v. Genuine Parts Co., 132 Idaho 849, 856-57, 979 
P.2d 1207, 1214-15 (1999) (applying statute of frauds). 
Here, similarly, the MRIA partnership agreement expressly and unambiguously sets an 
indefinite term. Section 1.1. of the agreement governs its "Effective Date and Term," and 
Section 1.1.2 provides that, in the event certain formative steps were completed by a set date, as 
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they were here, "then the term of this Partnership shall end on the date which is within a 
reasonable time after the business of the Partnership is wound up and dissolved under Article 
IO." (App. I (Trial Ex. 4023, §§ 1.1, 1.1.2).) The agreement provides, in other words, that after 
December 31, 1985, the partnership shall last until the partners decide to end it at any time. Like 
the "as long as" language of General Auto Parts and the "shall continue until dissolved" 
language of Courdy, the "shall end [when] ... wound up and dissolved" language of Section 
1. 1.2 embodies an agreement to leave open-ended the duration of the partnership. This is so, 
moreover, "even though there may be an obligation," such as Center's lease, that itself has a 
defined term. Idaho Code§ 53-3-101 cmt. Saint Alphonsus thus did not wrongfully dissociate 
"before the expiration of' a "definite term." 
MRIA argued below that the contract's language was capable of being supplemented by 
extrinsic evidence purporting to show that the parties intended MRIA's partnership term to be 
defined by the allegedly fixed terms of the Center and Mobile limited partnership agreements 
and Center's building lease, thus making the partnership term a question of fact for the jury. 
(Exhibit to R. #11, pp. 12-15 (citing a treatise and a number of pre-RUPA cases from various 
jurisdictions).) But such a claim is directly at odds with the parol evidence rule, which provides 
that "when a contract has been reduced to a writing that the parties intend to be a final statement 
of their agreement, evidence of any prior or contemporaneous agreements or understandings 
which relate to the same subject matter is not admissible to vary, contradict, or enlarge the terms 
of the written contract." Simons v. Simons, 134 Idaho 824, 828, 11 P.3d 20, 24 (2000). The 
MRIA partnership agreement was just such "a writing that the parties intend[ ed] to be a final 
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statement of their agreement." The parol evidence rule is therefore applicable to it, and thus bars 
consideration of the evidence relied upon by MRIA. 11 
The authorities cited by MRIA below to support the use of extrinsic evidence to modify 
contract provisions (see Exhibit to R. # 11, pp. 12-15) are wholly unavailing. All of the cited 
cases arise in situations where there was no "written contract" of the sort that "the parties [ would 
have] intend[ed] to be a final statement of their agreement," Simons, 134 Idaho at 828, 11 P.3d at 
24, and thus the parol evidence rule excluding such evidence did not apply. A majority of the 
cited cases involved an agreement that was entirely oral. 12 The others involved a written 
agreement that was completely silent on the issue of the partnership's durational term, thus 
leaving wholly unaddressed the parties' intentions on that essential point. 13 These cases thus 
stand only for the unexceptional proposition that extrinsic evidence of parties' contractual 
11 The separate lease and limited partnership agreements likewise are not admissible as 
subsequent oral modifications of the terms of the MRIA partnership agreement. The MRIA 
partnership agreement allows amendment "only through written instrument [sic J executed by all 
the Partners." (App. 6 (Trial Ex. 4023, § 12.1).) The lease and limited partnership agreements, 
however, were executed by a different collection of investor parties for entirely different reasons. 
See supra note 2. 
12 Owenv. Cohen, 119P.2d 713 (Cal. 1941);Zeibakv. Nasser, 82 P.2d375, 381 (Cal. 1938); 
Meherin v. Meherin, 209 P.2d 36, 37 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949); Zimmerman v. Harding, 227 U.S. 489, 
490 (1913); 68th St. Apts., Inc. v. Lauricella, 362 A.2d 78, 80 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976). 
13 Vangel v. Vangel, 254 P.2d 919,925 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953) (noting that "the agreement does 
not mention the term of the partnership"); Shannon v. Hudson, 325 P.2d I 022, I 023 & n. I (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1958) (informal written agreement with no specific mention of a term); Drashner v. 
Sorenson, 63 N.W.2d 255, 257-58 (S.D. 1954) (no specific mention of term); Pemberton v. 
Ladue Realty & Constr. Co., 180 S.W.2d 766, 771 (Mo. Ct. App. 1944) ("no express stipulation 
as to the duration of the partnership agreement"). 
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intentions is admissible where the predicate for the parol evidence rule-an integrated writing 
intended as a final statement of the agreement-is missing. 14 
In sum, where, as here, a written partnership agreement expressly defines "the term of 
this Partnership" as ending at an indefinite point in the future, resort to extrinsic evidence to set a 
definite term of the partnership is prohibited. For these reasons, the MRIA partnership 
agreement lacked a definite term, and the district court's entry of judgment on the claim of 
wrongful dissociation cannot be affirmed on the alternative theory that dissociation occurred 
before the expiration of a definite term. Rather, the district court should have granted summary 
judgment to Saint Alphonsus on this claim. 15 
14 Careful adherence to the parol evidence rule, excluding evidence which might supplement 
terms of a complete written partnership agreement, is especially important following the 
adoption ofRUPA in 1998. As explained above, RUPA radically (and retroactively) redefined 
the nature of partnerships, so that a partnership no longer depends strictly on the continuity of a 
specific collection of individuals, but instead is a continuing entity made up of partners who may 
come and go. See supra pp. 17-19. The implication of partnership terms based on oral 
understandings outside the four corners of a partnership agreement would be entirely unworkable 
under this "entity" theory of partnership, because any oral understandings that may exist between 
the original partners cannot fairly or practically be imposed on late joiners with no notice of them. 
See Walter E. Wilhite Revocable Living Trust v. Nw. Yearly Meeting Pension Fund, 128 Idaho 
539,548,916 P.2d 1264, 1273 (1996) (party's "contractual rights ... [may] not be taken away 
by a contract between [different parties]"). And it is plainly unworkable for a partnership to 
have a definite term with respect to some partners, but not others. 
15 Even if the durational term of the partnership agreement were properly a question of fact 
for the jury, Saint Alphonsus would still be entitled to a new trial on that issue based on the 
prejudicial effects of the district court's erroneous grant of summary judgment for MRIA on the 
claim for wrongful dissociation. See supra Part LB. 
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II. THE ADMISSION OF TWO PIECES OF INADMISSIBLE, MISLEADING, AND 
HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE INDEPENDENTLY REQUIRES A NEW 
TRIAL. 
The severe prejudice suffered by Saint Alphonsus as a result of the court's erroneous 
entry of summary judgment on the wrongful dissociation claim was compounded by the court's 
improper admission of two highly significant pieces of evidence-a memorandum containing 
privileged attorney-client communications and an offer of settlement. The district court 
permitted MRIA to use this evidence to argue, misleadingly and prejudicially, that Saint 
Alphonsus had acted in bad faith in its dealings with MRIA. Separately and together with the 
court's ruling on wrongful dissociation, these evidentiary errors entitle Saint Alphonsus to a new 
trial. 
A. Privileged Attorney-Client Communications Summarized In The Shattuck 
Hammond Memorandum Were Erroneously Admitted And Relied Upon To 
Argue That Saint Alphonsus Acted In Bad Faith 
The district court erred when it admitted into evidence, after denying Saint Alphonsus's 
motions in limine to exclude it, 16 a summary of legal advice of Saint Alphonsus's retained 
counsel, Givens Pursley, that "there would likely be litigation" if Saint Alphonsus dissociated 
from MRIA and that "there may be a risk of Saint Alphonsus breaching" a fiduciary duty if it did 
16 Saint Alphonsus twice moved prior to trial to exclude this evidence as protected by the 
attorney-client privilege (see Exhibit to R. #54, pp. 5-12; Exhibit to R. # 131, p. 5), and moved 
again after the verdict for a new trial based on the improper admission of this evidence (see 
Exhibit to R. #208, pp. 17-20). The district court denied all three motions. (See R., Vol. V, pp. 
848-50; R., Vol. XI, pp. 2116-18; R., Vol. XIII, pp. 2439-41.) 
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so. (App. 34 (Trial Ex. 4239, p. 11).)17 This privileged communication was memorialized in an 
internal memorandum prepared by two junior associates at the investment banking firm Shattuck 
Hammond, which had been retained by Givens Pursley in 2001 to "act as a consultant" to the law 
firm in connection with its representation of Saint Alphonsus in "evaluating what legal rights or 
options Saint Alphonsus may have with respect to its partnership interest." (Confidential Exhibit 
to R. #4, at Ex. A.) 18 At trial, MRIA repeatedly used Givens Pursley's assessment that litigation 
was "likely" in the event of dissociation to portray Saint Alphonsus as an intentional wrongdoer 
indifferent to its legal obligations and the rights of MRIA. Such misuse of privileged legal 
advice is clearly prejudicial and therefore warrants a new trial. 
Rule 502 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence extends the attorney-client privilege to 
"confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional 
legal services to the client." l.R.E. 502(b ). The Rule protects not only direct communications 
between a client and its counsel, but also communications "between the client's lawyer and the 
lawyer's representative." l.R.E. 502(b)(2). 
17 The memorandum containing these opinions states that Saint Alphonsus "has been advised 
by counsel that this option [ withdrawing from the partnership) would likely engender litigation 
with MRIA" (App. 33 (Trial Ex. 4239, p. 2)), and explains that "Givens Pursley believes that 
there would likely be litigation as to whether the termination was wrongful and that there may be 
a risk of St. Alphonsus breaching its fiduciary responsibility to the LPs" (App. 34 (Trial Ex. 
4239, p. 11)). An earlier version of the memorandum with identical language was also admitted 
at trial. (See Trial Ex. 4234, pp. 2, 8.) 
18 The retention letter provided that Shattuck Hammond would "be in direct contact with 
representatives of Saint Alphonsus," but that "any conclusions, preliminary or final, will be 
addressed to [Givens Pursley) and used by th[e] firm in connection with th[e) firm's rendering of 
legal advice to Saint Alphonsus." (Id.) 
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As an assessment of the litigation and liability risks of alternative courses of action 
available to Saint Alphonsus, the legal advice described in the memorandum plainly constitutes 
the rendition of legal services by Givens Pursley to Saint Alphonsus. As noted in the 
memorandum, Shattuck Hammond had "reviewed [Saint Alphonsus's options) with Givens 
Pursley" in order to obtain Givens Pursley' s "thoughts on the potential litigation involved with 
each alternative." (App. 34 (Trial Ex. 4239, p. 11).) The communication of this legal advice 
"between" Givens Pursley ("the client's lawyer") and Shattuck Hammond ("the lawyer's 
representative") about the litigation risks of various courses of action is privileged by the plain 
terms of Rule 502(b)(2). 19 
The district court refused to exclude the statement because it was embodied not in a 
memorandum from Givens Pursley to Shattuck Hammond (or vice versa), but rather appeared 
within an internal Shattuck Hammond document circulated among Shattuck Hammond 
employees. (R., Vol. XIII, pp. 2439-41.) In doing so, the district court misconceived the rules of 
privilege. It is well-settled that writings memorializing privileged communications, as well as 
communications about the privileged communications among attorneys or representatives, are 
"entitled to the same degree of protection from disclosure" as the original communications 
between attorneys and clients (or their respective representatives). Natta v. Zietz, 418 F.2d 633, 
637 n.3 (7th Cir. 1969); see also United States v. DeFonte, 441 F.3d 92, 95 (2d Cir. 2006) 
19 MRIA has suggested that privilege should not apply because Shattuck Hammond was 
actually acting as Saint Alphonsus's representative. But Rule 502(b)(l) also privileges 
communications "between the ... client's representative and the client's lawyer." As a result, 
even on MRIA's view, the sharing of legal advice by Givens Pursley ("the client's lawyer") with 
Shattuck Hammond ("the client's representative") would fall within the plain terms of Rule 502. 
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("memorializations of [privileged] conversations ... are protected from disclosure by the 
attorney-client privilege"); Alexander v. FBI, l 86 F.R.D. 154, 161 (D.D.C. l 999) ("[T]he 
attorney-client privilege applies to [writings] that describe communications from attorneys or are 
based on such communications. This principle has been followed by each court to have 
addressed this matter." (internal quotation marks omitted)). As one court has explained, a 
contrary rule would "penalize[) those" who write or consult with others in their firms and "would 
make a mockery of both the privilege and the realities of current legal assistance." Natta, 
418 F .2d at 63 7 n.3. Here, Shattuck Hammond recorded in a confidential internal writing both 
Givens Pursley's privileged communications with Saint Alphonsus and Shattuck Hammond's 
own privileged communication with Givens Pursley. This did not strip the communications of 
their privileged nature, and the court therefore erred when it admitted these portions of the 
memorandum. 
Finally, notwithstanding the district court's ruling after trial that admitting this evidence 
( even if error) was harmless (R., Vol. XIII, p. 2440), there is no doubt that the admission of the 
privileged portions of the memorandum prejudiced Saint Alphonsus. MRIA's counsel told the 
jury that the Shattuck Hammond memorandum (referred to as the "Finnerty memo") was one of 
"the most critical documents in the case." (Tr., Vol. III, p. 4302, L. 20.) Even though Givens 
Pursley had simply offered advice about litigation risks, and had not concluded that withdrawal 
was in fact wrongful, MRIA's counsel repeatedly used Givens Pursley's opinion to underscore 
the "wrongful" nature of Saint Alphonsus's conduct, undermine the credibility of Saint 
Alphonsus's witnesses and excoriate Saint Alphonsus and its officers (including CEO Sandra 
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Bruce) for acting in bad faith and with indifference to counsel's advice and the hospital's legal 
obligations. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol. II, p. 1861, L. 21 top. 1866, L. I; Tr., Vol. II, p. 1874, L. 13 to 
p. 1878, L. 16; Tr. Vol. III, p. 3593, L. 22 top. 3596, L. 8; Tr. Vol. III, p. 4302, L. 7-23; Tr., Vol. 
III, p. 4317, L. 10-19; Tr. Vol. III,p. 4321, L. 10-18.) A lay juror would likely not have 
understood that parties in a commercial context routinely seek and consider the opinions of 
counsel regarding legal and appropriate conduct, and that the liability risks and potential for 
litigation identified by counsel are not indicative of actual liability or fault. This error thus 
enabled MRIA to substantially predispose the jury and the outcome against Saint Alphonsus. A 
new trial is therefore required. 
B. A Settlement Letter Sent By MRIA Containing An Offer To Sell Its Interest 
In Center At A Stated Price Was Erroneously Admitted And Relied Upon To 
Justify Damages And To Argue That Saint Alphonsus Acted In Bad Faith 
The district court also erred when it allowed MRIA to introduce into evidence a 
confidential settlement offer made by MRIA to Saint Alphonsus. (See App. 45 (Trial Ex. 4332).) 
The court admitted the evidence, over Saint Alphonsus's objection, for the "limited purpose" of 
showing MRIA's "belief or their opinion as to what they felt the fair market [value] of the MRIA 
partnership was." (Tr., Vol. II, p. 1239, L. 9 top. 1246, L. 24; R., Vol. XIII, pp. 2441-42.) 
The admission of this document was improper under Rule 408 of the Idaho Rules of 
Evidence, which categorically provides that settlement offers are "not admissible to prove 
liability for, invalidity of, or amount of the claim or any other claim." l.R.E. 408; see also Idaho 
First Nat 'I Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 276 n.8, 824 P.2d 841, 851 n.8 
(1991) (settlement offers "clearly inadmissible" to show bad faith in settlement bargaining). All 
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agree that the letter is a settlement offer. It even bears the caption "CONFIDENTIAL 
SETTLEMENT OFFER MADE PURSUANT TO I.R.E. 408." (App A45 (Trial Ex. 4332).) 
The use to which the court permitted MRIA to put the letter falls squarely within the 
Rule's prohibition on the admissibility of settlement offers to prove the "amount of' a party's 
claim. MRIA contended at trial that the damages for Saint Alphonsus's dissociation from the 
partnership should be measured by the price Saint Alphonsus would have had to pay to purchase 
Center's business. (R., Vol. IX, pp. 1693-94.) To prove that value, MRIA presented the 
settlement letter as evidence corroborating the value of Center as established by third-party 
Shattuck Hammond. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 1953, L. I top. 1956, L. 6; id. p. 2063, L. 20 top. 2064, 
L. 17.) Relying in part on the settlement offer, the jury awarded such damages. This is precisely 
what Rule 408 is meant to disallow. 
The improper admission of the settlement letter prejudiced Saint Alphonsus, even beyond 
its improper use to prove value. MRIA was able to use Saint Alphonsus's rejection of the offer 
as evidence that Saint Alphonsus was purportedly negotiating in bad faith. Indeed, MRIA's 
counsel emphasized in his closing argument that the settlement offer (and Saint Alphonsus's 
rejection thereof) was "the telltale" sign of Saint Alphonsus's purported bad faith. (Tr., Vol. III, 
at 4322:1-15; see also id. p. 4296, L. 11-20; id. p. 4390, L. 9-14.) This "admi[ssion] of 
settlement negotiations between the parties, based on the claim that [ one party] negotiated ... in 
bad faith" is precisely the sort of use for which this Court has held settlement offers are "clearly 
inadmissible." Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho at 276 n.8, 824 P.2d at 851 n.8. When 
compounded with the district court's other prejudicial mistakes-allowing MRIA to tell the jury 
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that Saint Alphonsus had ignored the advice of its attorneys and had already been adjudicated a 
wrongdoer by the court-Saint Alphonsus stood no chance of having a fair trial. The crippling 
prejudice caused by these errors, separately and in combination, requires a new trial. 
III. HOWEVER THIS COURT RESOL YES THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
EVIDENTIARY ISSUES, IT MUST REVERSE THE DAMAGES AW ARD FOR 
MULTIPLE, INDEPENDENT REASONS 
Apart from the previously described errors, no damages award could be sustained in any 
event due to improper instructions and legally inadequate proof. 20 
The award to MRIA of $36.3 million for "lost profits" must be reversed on multiple 
grounds. First, the profits at issue were lost, if at all, by the limited partnerships, Center and/or 
Mobile, which owned the MRI business, and not by MRIA, which received as its income much 
more modest management fees for serving as the general partner of the limited partnerships. See 
infra Part Ill.A. Second, this Court cannot ignore this incongruity and assume the award was 
really intended for the limited partnerships, because such an inference is belied by the jury 
verdict form and the law of fiduciary duty. See infra Part III.B. Third, the "lost profits" 
damages award cannot be sustained in any event because MRIA failed to prove that Saint 
Alphonsus caused all or any particular portion of the "lost scans" whose proceeds constitute the 
jury award. See infra Part lll.C. Fourth, it was error for the district court to permit MRIA to 
20 At trial, MRIA sought $27.3 million in "lost benefit of the bargain" damages for its claim of 
wrongful dissociation, and in the alternative sought an award of $36.3 million in "lost profits" 
damages for "all other theories ofliability." (R., Vol. XII, pp. 2350-52.) Although the jury 
awarded the sum of both measures, MRIA conceded that they are duplicative and consented to a 
remittitur fixing damages at the higher alternative of$36.3 million. (R.., Vol. XIII, at 2435.) 
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introduce evidence of lost profits beyond December 31, 2015, the date on which the Center 
partnership was set to expire. See infra Part II!.D. 
Finally, if the award of $36.3 million for "lost profits" is set aside, it would be error to 
substitute in its place the jury's alternative award of "purchase price" damages of $27.3 million. 
This theory of damages for breach of contract finds no basis in the law and is unsupported by the 
evidence. See infra Part III. E. 
A. The Award Of Lost Scan Profits To MRIA Cannot Stand Because MRIA 
Had No Such Profits To Lose 
It is indisputable that the award of $36.3 million in damages represents profits allegedly 
lost by one or both of the limited partnerships, Center and Mobile. MRIA, which owns just a 
fraction of Center and Mobile, therefore did not suffer these damages, and the jury award to 
MRIA in its own name and on its own behalf was improper: 
Center and Mobile are the two limited partnerships established by MRIA for the purpose 
of engaging in the business of providing MRI services. See supra pp. 3-4. MRIA "provides no 
services directly" (App. 37 (Trial Ex. 4247, p. 5)), but rather receives a management fee of7.5% 
of Center's and Mobile's annual cash receipts for overseeing their operations (App. 11 (Trial Ex. 
4024 § 4.2)). MRIA owns just 30% of Center and Mobile; Saint Alphonsus and other investors 
own the remaining interests. (App. 37-40 (Trial Ex. 4247, pp. 5-8).) 
In presenting evidence of lost profits, MRIA's two damages experts relied exclusively on 
allegations of injury to Center and Mobile's business. Specifically, Bruce Budge estimated the 
number of scans diverted from the limited partnerships to IM! and applied their revenue and cost 
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figures in order to calculate the profits that were thus lost. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 2732, L. 6 top. 2754, 
L. 16.) MRlA's other expert, Charles Wilhoite, used Budge's calculations to predict diverted 
Jost future scans and resulting Jost profits. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 2861, L. 6 top. 2870, L. 21.) 
The $36.3 million in damages thus represents profits allegedly lost by Center and/or 
Mobile-the entities actually providing MRI scanning services-rather than any conceivable 
injury to MRIA itself. And because MRIA owns just 30% of the limited partnerships, the 
separate legal identity of these entities obviously cannot be ignored. Accordingly, this jury 
award to "MRIA" cannot be affirmed on the theory that MRIA actually suffered such damages. 
B. The Award Of Lost Scan Profits Cannot Be Sustained On The Theory That 
It Should Be Regarded As An Award To Center And/Or Mobile 
Since MRIA did not suffer the lost profits damages that constitute the present award, the 
award could only be sustained if this Court were to regard it as an award to one or both of the 
limited partnerships, Center and/or Mobile. However, the only claims submitted to the jury on 
behalf of Center and Mobile were causes of action for breach of the fiduciary duty allegedly 
owed to those entities. (R., Vol. XII, pp. 2293-96.) For two separate and independent reasons, 
this Court cannot reasonably regard the damage award as one made to the limited partnerships on 
that cause of action. First, because the claims of the limited partnerships were improperly 
combined in a single, disjunctive special-verdict question with MRIA's own claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty, there is no basis for concluding that the jury found Saint Alphonsus liable to 
either Center or Mobile. Second, Center's and Mobile's claims fail as a matter oflaw because 
Saint Alphonsus owed no fiduciary duties to them. 
-44-
1. The Jury Verdict Provides No Basis For Concluding That The Jury 
Actually Found Saint Alphonsus Liable To Center And/Or Mobile 
Contrary to ordinary practice, the district court allowed MRIA to assert claims "on behalf 
of" Center and Mobile without joining these distinct legal entities as parties. (R., Vol. V, pp. 
868-71.)2 1 This created a substantial risk that the jury would fail to distinguish between MRIA 
and the two limited partnerships and therefore not properly evaluate the separate legal rights, 
claims asserted, and damages suffered by those entities. This risk came to fruition when the 
court refused Saint Alphonsus's request for a special-verdict interrogatory that would have 
distinguished the separate fiduciary duty claims of the three entities (see Exhibit to R. #230, Instr. 
41, p. 3), and instead submitted a single special-verdict question (No. 9) asking the jury whether 
"Saint Aiphonsus breached a fiduciary duty owed to MRIA, MRI Center or MRI Mobile" (R., 
Vol. XII, p. 2296 ( emphasis added)). This was the only claim on behalf of Center and Mobile 
submitted to the jury (R., Vol. XII, pp. 2293-96), and because the court combined it with 
MRIA's own claim for breach of fiduciary duty, the jury was left with no way to indicate 
whether or not it had found liability to Center and Mobile-as distinguished from MRIA. 
This indeterminate character of the verdict arises from the disjunctive nature of the single 
jury interrogatory (No. 9) dealing with this issue. That interrogatory required the jury to enter a 
21 No legal authority permitted MRIA, as a general partner, to sue in a representative capacity 
"on behalf of' the limited partnerships. A limited partnership is a distinct legal entity, with a 
legal existence separate and apart from its partners, including its general partner. See Idaho 
Code § 53-2-104. Further, a limited partnership has "the power to sue, be sued, and defend in its 
own name," id.§ 53-2-105, and limited partnerships routinely do so in the courts of this State, 
see, e.g., Brandon Bay, LP v. Payette County, 142 Idaho 681, 132 P.3d 438 (2006). The district 
court thus erred when it allowed MRIA to proceed "on behalf of' the limited partnerships, 
without naming those legal entities as distinct parties. 
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finding of fiduciary duty liability if it concluded that Saint Alphonsus breached a fiduciary duty 
owed to any one of the three claimants-MRIA, Center "or" Mobile. (R., Vol. XII, p. 2296.) As 
to MRIA, under the instructions as given, the jury had no choice but to find a breach of the duty. 
It was instructed that Saint Alphonsus was liable if it failed "to act primarily for the benefit" of 
MRIA, ifit "act[edJ adversely" to MRIA, or ifit knowingly "violat[ed] the law." (Tr., Vol. III, 
p. 4281, L. 21 top. 4283, L. 10.) It was also instructed that Saint Alphonsus's dissociation from 
MRIA was "wrongful." (Tr., Vol. Ill, p. 4271, L. 4-11; id. p. 4273, L. 23 top. 4275, L. 4; id. 
p. 4283, L. 6-15.) By definition, such "wrongful" conduct.toward MRIA fell far short of acting 
"primarily for [MRIA's] benefit" and constituted "adverse" action toward MRIA. The 
conclusion that Saint Alphonsus violated its fiduciary duty to MRIA was thus unavoidable. 
Given that conclusion, the jury was required to answer special-verdict question No. 9 in 
the affirmative, even if it found no fiduciary duty liability to either of the limited partnerships. 
There was therefore no reason for the jury to proceed any further once it found a breach of duty 
to MRIA-since question No. 9 would be answered "yes" however the separate claims of the 
limited partnerships were resolved. Indeed, there is nothing in the verdict to suggest that the jury 
ever even thought about the question of liability to Center and Mobile. There was absolutely no 
reason for it to do so because, as noted above, the court had rejected Saint Alphonsus's request 
for jury instructions and special-verdict interrogatories distinguishing among the three entities' 
separate fiduciary duty claims. Accordingly, there is no basis on which to affirm the award of 
damages on the theory that the jury really intended it to go to Center and/or Mobile. 
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2. The Limited Partnerships' Sole Claims-For Breach Of Fiduciary 
Duty-Fail As A Matter Of Law Because Saint Alphonsus Owed No 
Fiduciary Duties To Center And Mobile 
Apart from the failure of the verdict form to communicate any decision by the jury on the 
fiduciary duty claims of Center and Mobile, those claims fail as a matter of law. The district 
court should have granted Saint Alphonsus's motions for summary judgment and judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict on those claims because Saint Alphonsus did not owe the limited 
partnerships any fiduciary duties. 
"Whether a fiduciary relationship exists is a question of law over which this Court 
exercises free review." Hayden Lake Fire Prof. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388,401, 111 P.3d 73, 
86 (2005). Duties owed by parties in a commercial relationship are generally defined by the 
agreements between them. See, e.g., Wooden v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho, N.A., 121 Idaho 98, 
100,822 P.2d 995,997 (1991). For some relationships, such as officers and directors ofa 
corporation, or partners in a partnership, a pertinent statute defines the applicable duties. See, 
e.g., Idaho Code § 30-1-830. In some special circumstances in which one party has placed his 
property, interests or authority in the charge of another, or reposed special trust and confidence 
in him, the common law may give rise to fiduciary obligations. See Bliss Valley Foods, 
121 Idaho at 277-78, 824 P.2d at 852-53. 
Saint Alphonsus was both a limited partner in Center and Mobile and a partner in the 
general partnership (MRIA) that was the general partner of both entities. As the court below 
correctly held, neither of these relationships gave rise to any statutory fiduciary duties owed by 
Saint Alphonsus to the limited partnerships. (R., Vol. X, pp. 1876-77.) RUPA defines with 
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specificity the duties that Saint Alphonsus owed to MRIA, but it nowhere suggests that those 
duties in any way extend further to other entities in which MRIA, but not Saint Alphonsus, is a 
general partner. See Idaho Code§ 53-3-404 ("a partner owes [fiduciary duties] to the partnership 
and the other partners"). And the Limited Partnership Act makes clear that only MRIA, as 
general partner, and not Saint Alphonsus, as a limited partner, owed fiduciary duties to Center 
and Mobile. See Idaho Code§ 53-224 (repealed effective July I, 2006). 22 
The district court nonetheless looked past these governing statutes to find a common-law 
fiduciary duty implied from the factual circumstances surrounding the relationship between Saint 
Alphonsus and the limited partnerships. As this Court has explained, however, common-law 
fiduciary duties arise only where one party places a "peculiar confidence" in another due to the 
"condition of superiority" of one of the parties over the other. Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho at 
277, 824 P.2d at 852. In other words, "in a fiduciary relationship, the property, interest or 
authority of the other is placed in the charge of the fiduciary." Id. (citation, emphasis, and 
internal quotation marks omitted). By contrast, arms-length relationships-especially involving 
sophisticated business entities--do not give rise to fiduciary duties. See id. (lender-borrower 
relationship did not give rise to common-law fiduciary duty). 
22 The conduct at issue in this case occurred prior to July I, 2006, when the Revised Uniform 
Limited Partnership Act replaced the Limited Partnership Act as the law applicable to existing 
limited partnerships. See Idaho Code § 53-2-1204. Accordingly, the breach of duty claim 
brought on behalf of Center and Mobile is governed by the Limited Partnership Act. In any 
event, the fiduciary standards set forth in the old and new versions of the Act are identical in all 
relevant respects. Compare Idaho Code § 53-2-408 with Idaho Code§ 53-3-404 (made 
applicable to limited partnerships by Idaho Code § 53-224 (repealed)). 
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The district court held that Saint Alphonsus owed such common-law duties to Center and 
Mobile because of "the unique manner in which [ the limited partnerships] were organized, 
structured, and operated." (R., Vol. X, p. 1880.) According to the court, this "unique" manner 
consisted of the fact that two Saint Alphonsus "representatives ... sat on the [ten-member] 
MRIA Board of Partners" and that this Board "conducted" the "business and affairs" ofMRIA, 
including the management of Center and Mobile. (Id., p. 1879.) 
These facts do not remotely satisfy the requirements for a common-law fiduciary duty. It 
is of course true that the agreements creating the limited partnerships vested MRIA with "all 
authority and responsibility" over the management of the businesses (App. 10, 16 (Trial Ex. 
4024 § 4.1; Trial Ex. 4028 § 4.1 )), and that MRIA owed them on that account a statutory 
fiduciary duty. But Saint Alphonsus had only two votes out often on the MRIA board, and thus 
had no ability to compel any action by MRIA, especially over the opposition of the five votes 
held by DMR. Thus, no reasonable jury could conclude that Saint Alphonsus's possession of 
two out of ten votes on the MRIA board established a "condition of superiority" over Center and 
Mobile or showed that the limited partnerships had placed a "peculiar confidence" in Saint 
Alphonsus. Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho at 277, 824 P.2d at 852. 
Indeed, the district court's holding that Saint Alphonsus owed common-law fiduciary 
duties to the limited partnerships, including the duty "to act primarily for the[ir] benefit" and to 
refrain from competing with them, had the effect of imposing on Saint Alphonsus, in its role as a 
minority stakeholder, a greater level of duty vis-a-vis Center and Mobile than the statutory duty 
that MRIA itself owed to Center and Mobile as their general partner. This is because the duties 
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owed by a general partner to a limited partnership are less strict than the fiduciary duties owed in 
a common-law fiduciary relationship. As explained in the official comment to Idaho Code 
§ 53-3-404, which sets forth the duties of the general partner to the limited partnerships in this 
case, see Idaho Code§ 53-224 (repealed); supra note 22, "the term 'fiduciary' [arguably) is 
inappropriate when used to describe the duties of a partner because a partner may legitimately 
pursue self-interest and not solely the interest of the partnership and the other partners, as must a 
true trustee." Idaho Code § 53-3-404 cmt. 
In sum, having found no statutory basis for holding that Saint Alphonsus owed a 
fiduciary duty to the limited partnerships, the district court should also have concluded, as a 
matter of law, that no common-law fiduciary duty could be inferred from that relationship.23 
C. MRIA's Proof Of Lost Scan Profits Was Fatally Deficient Because It Relied 
On The Unsupported Assumption That Saint Alphonsus Caused Every 
Single Change In Physician Referrals From Center To IMI 
The damages claim also fails as a matter oflaw because MRIA produced no evidence to 
connect its alleged $36.3 million in lost-scan damages, or any specific portion thereof, to Saint 
Alphonsus's alleged misconduct. This claim rested on the premise that every referral of a patient 
to IMI by any doctor who either had previously made referrals to Center or was affiliated only 
with Saint Alphonsus resulted from that alleged misconduct. But MRIA and its experts simply 
23 Even if the facts viewed most favorably to MRIA could support such an inference, a 
reasonable juror could also have found an absence of the sort ofrelationship needed to give rise 
to a common-law fiduciary duty. Indeed, the district court originally stated an intention to leave 
this issue for resolution by the jury. (R., Vol. X, pp. 1877-80.) However, without warning at the 
end of the trial, the court removed that question from the purview of the jury and held that the 
duty was owed as a matter oflaw. (Tr., Vol. Ill, p. 4201, L. 23 top. 4203, L. 21.) This was an 
error of law that, at a minimum, requires a new trial. 
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"assumed" that the assistance Saint Alphonsus provided to IMI caused all of these referrals to go 
to IMI. This assumption has no basis in law, logic or fact. The district court therefore erred 
when it denied Saint Alphonsus's motion for summary judgment on the issue of damage 
causation (Exhibit to R. # 102, pp. 12-16; R., Vol. XI, p. 2076), and erred again when it denied 
Saint Alphonsus's motion for JNOV on that same issue (R., Vol. XIII, pp. 2435-36). 
"The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove not only that it was injured, but that its injury 
was the result of the defendant's breach; both amount and causation must be proven with 
reasonable certainty." Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., 143 Idaho 733, 740, 152 P.3d 604,611 
(2007). Moreover, "the trier of fact must be able to find, reasonably, that the inference linking 
the defendant's conduct to the damage is more probable than an inference connecting the loss to 
other causes." Wingv. Hulet, 106 Idaho 912,919,684 P.2d 314,321 (Ct. App. 1984); see also 
Nw. Bee-Corp v. Home Living Serv., 136 Idaho 835, 41 I'.3d 263 (2002) (affirming district 
court's grant of summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff had failed as a matter of law to 
establish damage causation). In the context of claims for lost business or lost profits, a plaintiff 
may not presume that its loss is equivalent to its competitor's gain; instead, there must be 
substantial proof of what this Court has called a "correspondence between what its profit would 
have been and [the competitor's] actual profit." Trilogy Network Sys., Inc. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 
844,847, 172 P.Jd 1119, 1122 (2007). 
This Court has thus rejected the idea that all of a plaintiffs lost business can be attributed 
to a defendant's actionable conduct without specific proof of causation. In Pope v. 
lntermountain Gas Co., for example, the trial court awarded lost-profit damages for antitrust 
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violations based on the defendant's total revenues during the period that the violations occurred. 
103 Idaho 217,222,646 P.2d 988,993 (!982). This Court reversed because "[s]uch a method of 
figuring damages assumes, without any support in the record, that the [competitor's) operation 
would not have won any portion of the ... market absent antitrust violations." I 03 Idaho at 234, 
646 P.2d at 1005. Put another way, it is improper to assume "that 100% of [a company's) 
business losses" are attributable to a competitor's misconduct where the plaintiff"never 
attempted to isolate the effect of other causes on the volume of sales," including, for example, 
"the entry of [the competitor) into the competitive marketplace." Synthes Spine Co. v. Walden, 
No. 04-CV-4140, 2006 WL 30533 I 7, at* 16 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2006); see also Twin Falls Farm 
& City Distrib., Inc. v. D & B Supply Co., 96 Idaho 351,360,528 P.2d 1286, 1295 (1974) 
(noting that damages may not be awarded for "loss of customers" where "the evidence does not 
support a finding that all of the losses ... were the result of the [defendants') breaches" 
(emphasis added)).24 
Measured against these well-settled principles, MRIA's proof of damages causation is 
inadequate as a matter oflaw. MRIA relied on two witnesses to support its lost-scan damages 
calculation: Bruce Budge, who testified about damages from 1999 to 2006, and Charles 
Wilhoite, who extrapolated from Budge's numbers to estimate future losses from 2007 to 2023. 
In calculating how many scans Center "lost" as a result of the assistance allegedly provided to 
24 As one court has explained, to accept a damages award based on the difference between 
the plaintiff's revenues before and after the defendant's misconduct would "make a joke of the 
concept of expert knowledge" where the plaintiffs expert "ascribe[s) the entire difference 
between these revenue streams ... to [ the defendant's) misconduct, and none to ... lawful 
competition." Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410,415 (7th Cir. 1992). 
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IMI by Saint Alphonsus, Budge included every scan from every doctor who had previously 
referred scans to Center but then switched to IM!, as well as every scan from every doctor who 
was affiliated only with Saint Alphonsus. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 2738, L. 25 top. 2739, L. 12; id. p. 
2741, L. 23 top. 2742, L. 23.) He did not explain how or why all these changes in referrals were 
caused by Saint Alphonsus's alleged misconduct, but rather "assum[ed]" it, as though some other 
expert would establish causation: 
A. [Budge:) I'm assuming that without that course of conduct, that 
migration would not have occurred. 
Q. And you're not here to say that the bad acts caused it; you're 
assuming that they caused it? 
A. I'm not offering testimony on that. Logically, I need to 
understand the causation, and it seems reasonable. But I'm not 
weighing in on that." 
(Tr., Vol. II, p. 2785, L. 25 top. 2786, L. 9.) 
Budge's approach plainly fails to establish that Saint Alphonsus actually caused all of the 
changed referrals or to show what portion of those changed referrals were caused by Saint 
Alphonsus's conduct. Budge did not dispute that !MI would have existed regardless of Saint 
Alphonsus's actions. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 2732, L. 25 top. 2734, L. 17; id. p. 2764, L. I top. 2765, 
L. 3.) But he nevertheless completely ignored the effects of"the entry of[IMI) into the 
competitive marketplace," Synthes Spine Co., 2006 WL 3053317, at* I 6, and simply 
"assume[d) ... that [!MI] would not have won any portion of[this business) absent [Saint 
Alphonsus's conduct)," Pope, 103 Idaho at 234,646 P.2d at 1005. This was not enough. Budge 
( or another expert) "should have tried to separate the damages that resulted from the lawful entry 
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of a powerful competitor [IMI] ... from the damages that resulted from particular forms of 
misconduct allegedly committed by" !MI and Saint Alphonsus. Schiller, 969 F.2d at 415-16; see 
also Pope, 103 Idaho at 234,646 P.2d at 1005; Twin Falls, 96 ldaho at 360,528 P.2d at 1295. 
Nor did any other witness fill the evidentiary gap. MRIA did not show that a single 
physician actually changed his referring practices as a result of Saint Alphonsus's actions. To 
the contrary, several physicians gave unrebutted testimony that they began referring to !MI 
because of the identity and reputation of the IM! radiologists reading the scans, not because of 
any conduct by Saint Alphonsus. (See Tr., Vol. III, p. 3910, L. 11 top. 3911, L. 7; id p. 3994, 
L. 8 top. 3995, L. 16; id. p. 4138, L. 6 top. 4140, L. 4.) 
Indeed, the idea that Saint Alphonsus's conduct, including assistance it gave to IM!, 
could have caused all of the identified IMI referrals defies common sense. Budge testified that 
MRIA "had a monopoly" before IM! opened, "[a]nd when IMI came in, all of the sudden that 
referral base was diverted." (See Tr., Vol. II, p. 2790, L. 12-14.) When a monopolist faces a 
new competitor, some of its business is going to shift to the competitor, as Budge conceded. 
(See Tr., Vol. II, p. 2792, L. 10-15 ("Doesn't logic dictate that if MRI ran into a very formidable 
competitor, IM!, in 1999, logic certainly follows as to why IM!' s business would flourish and 
MRI's business would begin to tail off? [Budge:] It could explain it.").) More specifically, !MI 
was owned and operated by the group of radiologists who had, for many years, been serving the 
needs of patients at Saint Alphonsus and reading the scans generated at Center, and thus had 
long-standing consulting relationships with the treating physicians who worked at Saint 
Alphonsus. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 2425, L. 4-12; Tr. Vol. III, p. 3461, L. 10-24.) It is absurd to 
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suggest-and thus improper to allow the jury to infer-that none of the doctors that previously 
referred to Center would have sent any referrals to the people they trusted at !Ml, if only Saint 
Alphonsus had refrained from providing some technical support to !Ml. Indeed, as noted above, 
the evidence actually presented at trial showed that the identity of the radiologists and their 
established relationships and reputations were the main reasons that !MI took business away 
from Center. (See Tr., Vol. Ill, p.3911, L. 1 top. 3911, L. 7; id. p. 3994, L. 8 top. 3995, L. 16; 
id. p. 4138, L. 6 top. 4140, L. 4.)25 
In sum, to recover for lost profits, it was incumbent upon MRIA "to isolate the effect of 
other causes" for its lost scans, including "the entry of [!MI] into the competitive marketplace." 
Synthes Spine Co., 2006 WL 3053317, at *16. Because it did not do so, its claim for lost profits 
fails as a matter of law. 
D. The Damages Award Is Also Defective Because It Includes $6.0 Million For 
Injuries Allegedly Incurred After The Center Limited Partnership 
Agreement Was Set To Expire 
The district court also erred in allowing MRIA to seek recovery for "lost scan" damages 
beyond December 31, 2015, the date on which the Center limited partnership was set to expire 
pursuant to its limited partnership agreement. MRIA acknowledged this December 31, 2015 
termination date for Center, but argued that Center's term had been extended to December 3 I, 
2023. MRIA did not make any evidentiary showing to support its claim that the extension did, in 
fact, occur, and the district court thus erred in allowing the jury to determine the question. As a 
25 This case is thus unlike Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., in which there was no evidence 
of alternative causation and every lost opportunity was "more likely than not attributable to" the 
defendant's conduct. 143 Idaho 733, 741, 152 P.3d 604,612 (2007). 
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result, Saint Alphonsus was found liable for an additional $6.0 million in future lost profits, as 
calculated by MRIA's expert, between January 1, 2016, and December 31, 2023-a period of 
time when Center, by the terms of its limited partnership agreement, would have ceased to exist. 
(Compare Tr., Vol. III, p. 2860, L 11-16 with Exhibit to R. #! 18, Ex. J (Expert Op. ofC. 
Wilhoite) at 14.) 
Section 1.1 of the limited partnership agreement expressly provides that the Center 
partnership "shall continue ... through December 31, 2015," unless terminated earlier. (App. 7 
(Trial Ex. 4024 § 1.1).) Section 9.1 of the agreement provides that the agreement "may be 
amended only through [a] written instrument executed by the General Partner and the Limited 
Partners owning 75% of the outstanding Units" of limited partnership interests. (App. 13 (Trial 
Ex. 4024 § 9.1).) Although MRIA pointed to evidence of a vote on the question allegedly taken 
in 1998, it presented no evidence that any such written instrument was ever executed by the 
general partner and the limited partners, as required by the agreement.26 
Furthermore, it is undisputed that on August 18, 2000-long after the extension allegedly 
occurred-MRIA filed with the Secretary of State an Amended Certificate of Limited 
26 MRIA effectively conceded its failure to produce such evidence, but instead claimed that 
the limited partnership agreement was ambiguous and could be read to allow MRIA to extend 
Center's term at will. (R., Vol. XII, at 2391.) The contract's "interpretation and legal effect are 
questions oflaw," Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 177 P.3d 955, 
960 (2008) ( citation and quotation marks omitted), and as a matter of law, there is no ambiguity 
here. MRIA relied on Section 4 of the agreement, which gives MRIA the exclusive right to 
manage the limited partnership, and deemed it to be in conflict with the requirements of Section 
9.1 for modifying the limited partnership agreement. But the two provisions are entirely 
consistent because the power to manage Center's business pursuant to the terms of the limited 
partnership agreement is separate and distinct from the power to change the very terms of that 
agreement. 
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Partnership for Center, which indicated that the limited partnership term was to end in 2015. 
(App. 50 (Trial Ex. 104); see also Tr., Vol. III, p. 3523, L. 10 top. 3525, L. 2.) Thus, not only 
was there no evidence showing that the steps necessary to extend Center's term were completed, 
but the only evidence from the post-vote period shows that no extension was ever finalized. 
In short, the unambiguous terms of the limited partnership agreement required a 75% 
vote of the limited partnership interests and a writing to be effective. The complete absence of 
any evidence of such steps is thus fatal to MRJA's extension claim, as no reasonable jury could 
have found, on the evidence presented, that Center's term had been extended to 2023. For this 
reason also, the $6.0 million in damages for the period between 2016 and 2023 must be set aside. 
E. MRIA Is Not Entitled To The Claimed Alternative Measure Of Damages 
Based On The Hypothetical Purchase Price Of Center 
If the $36.3 million lost-profits measure of damages is set aside, MRIA will likely seek 
reinstatement of the $27 .3 million award based on the "purchase price" of Center, which was set 
aside by the district court's remittitur. (R., Vol. XIII, p. 2435.) MRIA has maintained 
throughout the proceedings that this latter measure of damages is being asserted solely for the 
wrongful dissociation claim brought by MRIA, and that this measure of damages in theory 
represents the money that Saint Alphonsus would have had to pay to MRIA to rightfully 
withdraw from the partnership. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 574, L. 13 top. 584, L. 9; Tr., Vol. III, p. 4382, 
L. 6 top. 4385, L. 25.) However, even if Saint Alphonsus were liable on the claim for wrongful 
dissociation, but see supra Parts I.A & LC, MRIA's purchase-price theory of damages is not a 
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legally sound way to measure damages for breach of contract because it does not even purport to 
measure any injury allegedly suffered by MRIA as a result of Saint Alphonsus's dissociation. 
"[T]he proper measure of damages is a question of law which is reviewed de nova." Gen. 
Auto Parts Co. v. Genuine Parts Co., 132 Idaho 849, 854, 979 P.2d l 207, 1212 (1999). The 
correct measure of damages for a claimed breach of contract is "the loss in the value ... of [the 
breaching party's] performance ... plus any loss, including incidental or consequential, caused 
by the breach." Gilbert v. Tony Russell Constr., 115 Idaho 1035, 1039, 772 P.2d 242,245 (Ct. 
App. 1989) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 347 (1981)). In the specific context of 
partnership contracts, RUPA specifies that "[a] partner who wrongfully dissociates is liable to 
the partnership and to the other partners for damages caused by the dissociation," Idaho Code 
§ 53-3-602(c), such as "replacing the partner's expertise or obtaining new financing," id. § 53-3-
602 cmt. 3. 
MRIA's "purchase price" theory of damages violates these fundamental principles. 
Instead of trying to show the extent of the harm caused to MRIA by Saint Alphonsus 's 
dissociation in 2004, MRIA advanced a convoluted theory that resulted in an award far greater 
than any plausible amount of actual injury. Specifically, MRIA argued that dissociating allowed 
Saint Alphonsus to imperrnissibly compete against MRIA. (R., Vol. IX, p. 1687.) But rather 
than trying to quantify the harm to MRIA from this competition, MRIA argued that it should 
recover "the fair market value of a transaction"-Saint Alphonsus's hypothetical purchase of 
Center's entire business from MRIA-"that [would have] rightfully accomplished what [Saint 
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Alphonsus] has, to date, secured wrongfully." (Id.; see also Tr., Vol. III, p. 4310, L. 22-23) 
("The $27.3 million represents what it would have cost Saint Al's to do this the right way.").) 
The price that Saint Alphonsus would have paid for Center bears no relation to any harm 
suffered by MRIA as a result of Saint Alphonsus's dissociation. In particular, MRIA has never 
claimed that this dissociation totally destroyed Center or rendered it valueless, such that the 
"purchase price" accurately measures actual injury. Nor did MRIA have any contractual right to 
the "purchase price" that was lost as a result of the dissociation, for the simple reason that Saint 
Alphonsus had no contractual obligation to purchase Center, whether or not it stayed in the 
partnership. Indeed, MRIA's "purchase price" theory of damages is all the more absurd given 
that MRIA only owns 30% of Center (see supra note 2) and therefore cannot possibly have 
suffered damages equivalent to the full value of Center. 
In sum, because the supposed price of purchasing Center has nothing to do with any 
injury to MRIA caused by Saint Alphonsus's dissociation, MRIA cannot recover that "purchase 
price" as a measure of damages. 
IV. SAINT ALPHONSUS IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES 
Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) provides that "[i]n any civil action" arising out of"any 
commercial transaction ... , the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to 
be set by the court." This provision "compels an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in 
a civil action to recover in any commercial transaction," Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M & 
Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 177 P.3d 955, 965 (2008), and provides for the recovery 
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of fees incurred both at trial and on appeal, see, e.g., Fox v. Mountain W Elec., Inc., 137 Idaho 
703, 712, 52 P.3d 848, 857 (2002). 
After trial, the district court awarded fees to MRIA under§ 12-120(3), holding that 
MRIA's claims arose out of a commercial transaction because they relate to the alleged "breach 
of express terms contained within a partnership agreement - a contract." (R., Vol. XIII, p. 
2448.) This holding reflects the general rule that fees are appropriate under§ 12-120(3) where 
the claims at issue are "integral" to a business relationship, such as claims for the breach of a 
commercial contract like the one that existed between MRIA and Saint Alphonsus. Esser Elec. v. 
Lost River Ballistics Techs., Inc., 145 Idaho 912, 188 P.3d 854,863 (2008). 
Accordingly, if this Court rules for Saint Alphonsus, it should award Saint Alphonsus its 
attorney fees on appeal to be determined in accordance with Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 4 I. In 
addition, because Saint Alphonsus rather than MRIA will be the "prevailing party" in this civil 
action, the district court's award of fee and costs for MRIA should be vacated along with the 
judgment for MRIA, and the case remanded with instructions that the district court calculate and 
award the fees and costs incurred by Saint Alphonsus at trial. 
CONCLUSION 
1. For the foregoing reasons, Saint Alphonsus requests entry of judgment as follows: 
a. Saint Alphonsus is entitled to judgment on MRIA' s claims for wrongful 
dissociation because, as a matter of law, Saint Alphonsus's dissociation breached neither an 
express term of the partnership agreement (see Part I.A) nor a term of years (see Part LC), and 
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also because MRIA's theory of"purchase price" damages in support of this claim is legally 
inadequate and unsupported by the evidence (see Part III.E). 
b. Saint Alphonsus is entitled to judgment on MRIA's claims for breach of 
the non-compete clause, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, tortious interference with prospective business relations and conspiracy because MRIA 
offered no evidence of damages that were even arguably suffered by MRIA, as distinct from the 
limited partnerships, Center and Mobile (see Part III.A), and also because MRIA failed in any 
event to prove that Saint Alphonsus caused all or any particular portion of the claimed lost 
profits (see Part III.C). 
c. Saint Alphonsus is entitled to judgment on the claims for breach of 
fiduciary duty brought "on behalf" of Center and Mobile because the jury verdict cannot 
reasonably be construed as finding liability to Center and Mobile on those claims (see Part 
III.B.l), because Saint Alphonsus as a matter of law owed no fiduciary duties to Center and 
Mobile (see Part III.B.2), and also because MRIA failed to prove that Saint Alphonsus actually 
caused all or any specific portion of the claimed lost profits (see Part 111.C). 
2. In the alternative, Saint Alphonsus is entitled to a new trial on all of the claims 
asserted in the district court because (a) the district court's erroneous grant of summary judgment 
on the claim for wrongful dissociation (see Part I.A) and the court's evidentiary errors (see Part 
II), separately and cumulatively, prejudiced the jury against Saint Alphonsus and denied Saint 
Alphonsus a fair trial (see Parts LB & II), and also because (b) whether Saint Alphonsus 
breached an express term of the partnership agreement by dissociating and whether Saint 
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Alphonsus owed any fiduciary duty to Center and Mobile are questions that, at a minimum, 
should have been submitted to the jury rather than resolved against Saint Alphonsus as a matter 
oflaw. (See Parts I.A n.7 & IV.B.2 n.23.) 
3. In the alternative, Saint Alphonsus is entitled to a $6 million reduction in the 
damages assessed because any award of lost profits should not have included profits allegedly 
lost after 2015. (See Part Ill.D.) 
4. Saint Alphonsus further requests that this Court award Saint Alphonsus its 
attorney fees on appeal, and also reverse the district court's award of costs and fees to MRIA and 
remand for calculation and award of the costs and fees incurred by Saint Alphonsus at trial. (See 
Part IV.) 
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ARTICLES OF PARTNERSHIP 
OF 
MRI ASSOCIATES 
THESE ARTICLES OP PARTNERSHIP have been entered into 
effective this .26th day of April, 1985, by and among DOCTORS 
MAGNETIC RESONANCE, INC., an Idaho corporation ("OMR"), SAINT 
ALPHONSUS MAGNETIC RESONANCE, !NC., an Idaho nonprofit 
corporation ("SAMR"J, MEDNOW, INC., an Idaho corporation ("MN"), 
and HCA OF IDAHO, INC., an Idaho corporation ("HCA"), 
Except as modified hereunder, the parties hereto hereby 
form a general partnership pursuant to the Uniform Partnership 
Law of the State of Idaho. The parties agree that the conduct of 
the Partnership shall be in accordance with the terms and 
provisions herein set forth. 
ARTICLE l 
GENERAL PROVIS ION/l 
Section 1.1 Effective Date and Term. The effective 
date of these Articles of ·Partnership is the twenty-sixth day of 
April, 1985, and shall terminate as follows: 
1,1.l If the Limited Partnership contemplated pursuant 
to Section 1,6 is not formed and the limited partnership 
interests sold in accordance with the Private Placement 
Memorandum, or this Partnership does not otherwise acquire 
financing acceptable to all Partners to replace the funds 
which were to be acquired by the limited partnership 
offering, on or before December 31, 1985, then the term of 
this Partnership shall end on December 31, 1985. 
l, l. 2 • If the Limited Partnership contemplated by 
Section 1.6 is formed and the limited partnership interests 
sold, and/or other financing mutually acceptable to all 
Partners to replace all or a portion of the funds which were 
to be acquired by the limited partnership offering is 
acquired on or before December 31, 1985, then the term of 
this Partnership shall end on the date which is within a 
reasonable time after the busine·ss of the Partnetship is 
wound up and dissolved under Article 10. 
In the event the Partnership terminates due to a failure 
of the conditions set forth in Section 1.1.l, all debts and 
obligations incurred by or on behalf of the Partnership shall be 
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Section 1,6 Purpose. The purpose of this Partnership 
is to purchase, lease or otherwise acquire, finance, manage 
operate, use, control, hold, sell and otherwise transfer medical 
diagnostic devices, equipment and accessories and therapeutic 
devices, equipment and accessories related to such diagnostic 
devices and equipment, together with buildings and other 
facilities associated therewith, and to transact any and all 
business matters incident thereto. The initial diagnostic 
equipment to be acquired shall be a magnetic resonance imaging 
device. 
This Partnership intends to promote and organize an 
Idaho limited partnership (the "Limited Partnership"). Limited 
partnership interests in the Limited Partnership shall be offered 
for sale pursuant to a Private Placement Memorandum approved by 
the Board of Partners as provided in section 5.4.5 and prepared 
and presented in accordance with applicable federal and state 
securities laws and exemptions. When formed, the Limited 
Partnership shall have the same purpose as this Partnership. 
This Partnership and any entity in which it has an 
ownership interest shall not engage in any other business 
activity except those set forth above without the approval of the 
Board of Partners required by Section 5,4.4. 
ARTICLE 2 
MANAGEMENT FEE 
Section 2,1 Management Fee. When the timited 
Partnership is formed, the Limited Partnership Agreement will 
provide for an annual management fee payable by the Limited 
Partnership to the Partnership of $90,000 or 7,5% of the Limited 
Partnership's annual cash receipts from operations, whichever is 
greater. The management fee will be paid to the Partnership in 
monthly installments of $7,500 each, with an annual adjustment to 
be made at the time the annual audit of the Limited Partnership 
is completed, if such audit shows that annual cash receipts from 
operations exceed $1,200,000. 
2.1.l Unless and until a Partner's interest in this 
Partnership is terminated or transferred as authorized in 
Articles 6, 7 and 8, or a new Partner is admitted, when 
received by the Partnership, the management fee will be 
forthwith allocated among and paid to the Partners, as 
follows, 
DMR 5/9 
SAMR 2/9 
MN l/9 
FICA 1/9 
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Catholic Church as designated from time to time; or (iv) is or 
may be in violation of any local, state or federal laws, rules or 
regulations. tn the event that a Hospital Partner withdraws, 
such Hospital Partner's interest in the Partnership shall 
terminate on the date of withdrawal, and that interest, 
including, without limitation, the Hospital Partner's vote on the 
Board of Partners and its interest in the Partnership management 
fee, shall be reallocated among the remaining Hospital Partners, 
(If there are no remaining Hospital Partners, the reallocation 
shall be among the remaining Partners), Unless otherwise agreed, 
the withdrawing Hospital Partner shall only be entitled to 
receive for its interest in the Partnership an amount which is 
equal to the balance in such Hospital Partner's capital account 
at the time of withdrawal, 
' 
6.2 Payment for Interest. The price for the 
withdrawing Hospital Partner's interest in the Partnership shall 
be paid to such Hospital Partner by the Partners to which its 
interest in the Partnership has been allocated, without interest, 
in installments equal to, and due at the same time as, 
distributions of the Net Cash Flow which .the Hospital Partner 
would have received had it remained a Partner in the Partnership. 
6,3 Loans and Other Liabilities. Loans payable to the 
withdrawing Hospital Partner shall be paid as provided herein, 
Withdrawal shall not relieve the Hospital Partner from its 
contingent liability for its Capital Ratio share of Partnership 
liabilities in existence on the date of withdrawal, 
ARTICLE 7 
TRANSFERS OF PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS 
Section 7, 1 Restrictions. No Partner shall sell, 
assign, transfer, pledge or hypothecate its interest in the 
Partnership, including all of its property and assets, or agree 
to do the same, except in accordance with the provisions of this 
Article. 
Section 7.2 Transfers Between Partners. A Partner may 
sell, assign and transfer its interest in the Partnership to the 
Partnership or to another Partner for such price and on such 
terms and conditions as they may agree subject to the following 
rights of refusal. In the event that any Hospital Partner 
receives an offer to purchase its interest in the Partnership and 
desires to accept such offer, that Hospital Partner first shall 
give written notice of such offer to all the other Partners, The 
notice shall set forth all the terms of such offer, including the 
name and address of the proposed purchaser. The Hospital 
Partners receiving such notice shall have forty-five (45) days 
after they have received notice to elect to purchase such 
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LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 
OF 
MRI LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
THIS L!MITED PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT of MRI LIMITED 
PARTNER~IP (the 7artnership") has been entered into effective 
this :z_.o day of f±l/,611 S.T , 1985, by and among the persons and 
entit'Ieswhose names appear on Exhibit A hereto as the General 
Partner and as the Limited Partners respectively, 
The parties hereto hereby form a limited partnership 
pursuant to the Idaho Limited Partnership Act. The parties agree 
that the conduct of the Partnership shall be in accordance with 
the terms and provisions herein set forth. 
ARTICLE l 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Section 1.1 Effective Date and Term. The effective date of 
this Agreement and the Partnership shall be the date that the 
Certificate of Limited Partnership is filed with the office of 
the Idaho Secretary of State on behalf of the Partnership. The 
Partnership shall continue from the effective date through 
December 31, 2015, unless earlier dissolved in accordance with 
the provisions of Article 6 hereof. 
Section 1,2 Offices: Registered Agent. The office of the 
Partnership shall be maintained in the City of Boise, County of 
Ada, State of Idaho, and such other locations in the State of 
Idaho as may be selected by the General Partner. The registered 
agent of the Partnership for service of process shall be such 
individual or corporation as shall be selected by the General 
Partner. 
Section 1.3 Partners. 
1.3.1 The term "Partners" shall refer, collectively and 
individually, to those persons and entities who are parties 
to this A.greement and ·those persons and entities hereafter 
admitted to partner status, excluding those whose status as a 
Partner has been terminated as provided in Article 5. 
l,3.2 The term "General Partner• shall refer to MRI 
ASSOCIATES, an Idaho general partnership. 
1.3.3 The term "Limited Partners" shall refer 
individually and collectively to those persons and entities 
whose names appear on Exhibit A hereto as Limited Partners 
.. "'." ~,4 ;".., ":" .... 
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and shall mean the cash on hand at the beginning of a fiscal year 
plus total cash receipts of the Partnership for such fiscal year 
(excluding capital contributions for such fiscal year) from which 
there shall be deducted: (i) all current operating expenses of 
the Partnership (excluding any expense not involving a cash 
expenditure, such as any amount charged for depreciation), (ii) 
all payments made on Partnership obligations during such fiscal 
year, (iii) any amounts spent by the Partnership for capital 
expenditures during such fiscal year; (iv) the amounts due during 
such fiscal year to Partners (principal and interest) on any 
loans made to the Partnership; and (v) a reserve for working 
capital, the amount of which shall be determined by the General 
Partner in its absolute discretion. 
Section 3.2 Distribution of Excess Net Cash Flow. 
3.2.1 Unless and until the Limited Partners have 
received cash distributions, pursuant to this Section 3.2, 
equal to their total capital contributions made pursuant to 
sections 2.1,3 and 2.1.5, the General Partner shall·. 
distribute Net Cash Flow among the Partners in the following 
proportions (hereinafter referred to as "Sharing Ratios") not 
later than 120 days after the end of each fiscal year: 
General Partner 11 
Limited Partners 99\ 
3.2,2 After the Limited Partners have received cash 
distributions, pursuant to this Section 3.2, equal to their 
total capital contributions made pursuant to Sections 2,l,3 
and 2.l.5, the General Partner shall distribute Net Cash Flow 
among the Partners in the following Sharing Ratios not later 
than 120 days after the end of each fiscal year: 
General Partner 30% 
Limited Partners 701 
3.2.3 At all times, the Net Cash Flow distributed to 
the Limited Partners collectively shall be distributed among 
the various Limited Partners in the same relationship of the 
amounts of their respective capital contributions made 
pursuant to Sections 2.1.3 and 2.1.S. 
3.2.4 Anything to the contrary herein notwithstanding, 
no distributions of Net Cash Flow shall be made at any time 
that payments on any Partnership obligation shall be 
delinquent. No Partner shall be entitled to any Net Cash 
Flow distributions or any other distributions if such Partner 
is in material default of the terms of this Agreement. 
Material default shall include, without limitation, the 
failure to make a capital contribution required pursuant to 
Section 2.1.3, 
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under the Idaho Limited Partnership Act, the General Partner 
shall have the power, on behalf of the Partnership: 
4.1.l To expend the capital of the Partnership for the 
acquisition, establishment, operation and management of a 
medical diagnostic facility, including without limitation the 
acquisition of any real or personal property, in fee or 
lease, or any rights therein, necessary or appropriate for 
the operation of such facility: 
4.1.2 To negotiate, and enter into, agreements of every 
nature necessary or incidental to the accomplishment of the 
Partnership's purpose, including without limitation 
agreements with the General Partner or the partners that 
comprise the General Partner1 
4.1.3 To employ from time to time at the expense of the 
Partnership, persons, firms or corporations to render 
services generally needed to accomplish the Partnership's 
purposes: 
4.1.4 To borrow monies for and on behalf of the 
Partnership upon such terms and conditions as it may deem 
advisable and proper by secured or unsecured indebtedness 
and, in connection therewith, to issue evidences of 
indebtedness and execute and deliver mortgages, deeds of 
trust, assignments, and other security instruments of every 
nature and kind as security therefor, and to prepay or 
refinance any Partnership debt; and 
4.1.5 To execute, acknowledge and deliver any and all 
instruments, and to take such other steps as are necessary, 
to effectuate the foregoing and as are consistent therewith. 
Section 4.2 •. Management Fee. For its services in the management 
of the Partnership, the General Partner shall receive an annual 
fee equal to the greater of Ninety Thousand and No/100 Dollars 
($90,000.00) or seven and one-half percent (7.5%) of the 
Partnership's cash receipts from operations. For its services 
during 1985, the General Partner shall receive a management fee 
of Ninety Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($90,000,00).· The 
management fee will be paid in monthly installments of Seven 
Thousand Five Hundred and No/100 Dollars ($7,500.00) each, with 
an annual adjustment to be made at the time that the annual audit 
of the Partnership is completed, if such audit shows that annual 
cash receipts from operations exceed One Million Two Hundred 
Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($1,200,000.00). Such management fee 
shall be a guaranteed payment, shall be treated as a current 
operating expense of the Partnership, and shall be in addition to 
any distribution of Net Cash Flow that the General Partner 
receives, based upon its Sharing Ratio In addition to the annual 
management fee, the Partnership shall reimburse the General 
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otherwise determined by the General Partner, and shall be kept at 
the offices of the Partnership. Within 75 days after the close 
of each fiscal year of the Partnership, the General Partner shall 
furnish to each Limited Partner all the information necessary for 
the preparation of his federal, state, local or other tax 
returns. Within 120 days after the close of each fiscal year of 
the Partnership, the General Patner shall furnish to each Limited 
Partner audited financial statements prepared in accordance with 
then generally accepted accounting principles by the independent 
certified public accountants of the Partnership. All financial 
statements shall be accurate in all material respects and shall 
present fairly the financial position and results of the 
operations of the Partnership. 
Section ~.3 Other Restrictions. No Partner shall become a 
surety, guarantor or accommodation party as a Partner or in such 
manner as would impose an obligation thereunder upon the 
Partnership or the remaining Partners. 
Section 8.4 Notice. Any notice required or permitted· to be 
delivered hereunder shall be deemed received when personally 
delivered or when deposited in the United States mail, postage 
prepaid, registered or certified with return receipt requested, 
or sent by telegram or mailgram, or by recognized courier 
delivery (i.e., Federal Express, Airborne, Burlington, etc.), 
addressed to the Partners as the case may be, at the address set 
forth on Exhibit A, or at such other addresses as a Partner 
subsequently designates by written notice given in the manner 
provided in this section. 
ARTICLE 9 
AMENDMENT--SEVERABILITY 
Section 9.1 Amendments. This Agreement may be amended only 
through written instrument executed by the General Partner and 
the Limited Partners owning 75% of the outstanding Units. 
Section 9.2 Severability. It is agreed that the invalidi~y_or 
unenforceability of any Article, Section, paragraph or provision 
of shall not affect the validity or enforceability of any one or 
more of the other Articles, Sections, paragraphs or provisions 
thereof. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Limited Partnership Agreement 
has been executed the day and year herein first above written. 
GENERAL PARTNER: 
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2.2.2 Partnership borrowings and all other Partnership 
obligations shall be paid from funds of the Partnership 
available for and subject to distribution to the Partners. 
If such Partnership funds are insufficient, the General 
Partner may loan funds to the Partnership or make a 
contribution to Partnership capital in the amount of such 
deficiency. 
ARTICLE 3 
DISTRIBUTION OF NET CASH FLOW AND 
ALLOCATION OF PROFIT AND LOSS 
Section 3.1 Net cash Flow Defined. As used in this Article, 
the term "Net cash Flow• shall be determined for each fiscal year 
and shall mean the cash on hand at the beginning of a fiscal year 
plus total cash receipts of the Partnership for such fiscal year 
(excluding capital contributions for such fiscal year) from which 
there shall be deducted: (i) all current -0perating expenses of 
the Partnership (excluding any expense not involving a cash 
expenditure, such as any amount charged for depreciation); (ii) all payments made on Partnership obligations during such 
fiscal year; (iii) any amounts spent by the Partnership for 
capital expenditures during such fiscal year; {iv) the amounts 
due during such fiscal year to Partners (principal and interest) 
on any loans made to the Partnership; and (v) a reserve for 
working capital, the amount of which shall be determined by the 
General Partner in its absolute discretion • 
section 3.2 Distribution of Excess Net Cash Flow. 
3.2.l Unless and until the Limited Partners have 
received cash distributions, pursuant to this Section 3.2, 
equal to 50% of their total capital contributions made 
pursuant to Section 2.1.3, the General Partner shall 
distribute Net Cash Flow among the Partners in the following 
proportions {hereinafter referred to as "Sharing Ratios") not 
later than 120 days after the end of each fiscal year: 
General Partner 1% 
Limited Partners 99% 
3.2.2 After the Limited Partners have received cash 
distributions, pursuant to this Section 3.2, equal to 50% of 
their total capital contributions made pursuant to section 
2.1.3, the General Partner shall distribute Net Cash Flow 
among the Partners in the following Sharing Ratios not later 
than 120 days after the end of each fiscal year: 
General Partner 30% 
Limited Partners 70% 
3.2.3 At all times, the Net Cash Flow distributed to 
the Limited Partners collectively shall be distributed among 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT - 5 
App.15 
5 
026881 
DATE: 
TIME AND 
PLACE: 
PRESENT: 
RECORDING: 
EXCUSED: 
MRI CENTER OF IDAHO 
October 22, 1998 
Dining Room B, at 5:30 P.M., Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Center 
) 
Sandra Bruce, President & CEO, 
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center 
Mark Adams, Chief Executive Officer, 
West Valley Medical Center 
Milt Kutsurelis, Executive Vice President, 
Mercy Medical Center 
Marty Hutson, CFO, Holy Rosary Medical Center 
John M. Havlina, Jr., M.D. 
David J. Giles, M.D. 
Roger J. Curran, M.D. 
Thomas E. Henson, M.D. 
James M. Prochaska, M.D. 
Tim Gilliam, MRI CI Chief Operations Officer 
Lyndee Chatterton, MRI CI Chief Operations Officer 
Jeff Cliff, Practice Management 
Paul DeWitt, Practice Management 
Tim Hall, M.D. 
Paul Traughber, M.D. 
Paul DeWitt, Practice Management 
Karl Kurtz, Vice President of Finance , 
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center 
Mike Czech, Director, MRICI 
CALL TO ORDER: 
MOTION: The meeting was opened at 5:30 P.M., with a brief discussion of the 
minutes dated September 10, 1998. Motion was moved, seconded 
and carried to approve the minutes dated September 10, 1998. 
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MRI CENTER OF IDAHO MINUTES 10-22-98 
Page 3 of3 
COMMITTEE 
REPORTS: Eauioment, Building and Personnel 
James M. Prochaska, M.D. requested a formal written policy be 
incorporated regarding the handling of hospital STAT MRI cases. 
Lyndee Chatterton will meet with VP of nursing and report to the 
board. 
AD,JOURNMENT: 
There being no further business to come before the Board, 
the meeting was adjourned at 8:40 P.M. 
The next meeting will be held Wednesday, November 18, 1998, 
5:30 P.M., Sister Patricia, Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center. 
Sandra Bruce, President & CEO, 
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center 
App. 19 
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4) VISION STATEMENT: The Vision Statement was affinned It is a goal to have this 
same quality service ten years from now in all subsequent Imaging Centers. 
B. ARCHITECTURAL IMAGES: Dr. Seabourn met with Mike Falash. The room sizes have 
been determined and Toshiba's electrical drawings are in. Siemens drawings should be in 
by the end of the month. Mike would like to submit the final drawings to the Planing and 
Zoning Committee by the first of March if all goes well. Dr. Scaboum will ask Mike to fit 
the recovery room area with diagonal doors. Dr. Seaboum will also talk to Mike regarding 
if doors are necessary to protect the workers from radiation dose berween rooms. The 
storage area will be left as is. 
C. LOGO: Dr. Newton has spoken with Tom Foerstel from Foerstel Design regarding a logo 
for the center. Dr. Newton stated that Tom preferred to have a condensed list of suggestions 
and a discussion was held lo compile a list of ideas for Tom to begin working with. (See 
attachment). 
D. PHONE: The deadline for space in the phonebook is 9-99. Of.Murray stated that an 
account will need to be established. Dr. Murray will also check with the other phonebook 
companies. Dr. Murray stated thal the Group has a choice of 14 prefixes. Dr. Murray will 
check to see what prefixes are available to allow 9729 (x-ray) to be used as the last four 
digits. The need for an 800 number was also raised. Dr. Murray questioned if the Group 
would like to advertise to the more remote regions such as Mountain Home, Ontario, etc. [1 
was decided that Mountain Home, Caldwell, McCall and Nampa should be included. 
Advertisements will run approximately $425.00 per month for 1/, page ad, $850.00 per 
month for 1/, page ad and $ I ,800.00 per month for a full-page ad. It was felt that a ¼ page 
ad could be used in the beginning. Dr. Murray will get back with the Executive Committee 
regarding the prices for the remote regions. Mike Falash will need to know where the 
phones are being installed for the final plans. Dr. Seaboum will send a copy of the plans to 
Gary Westcott· to help finalize the phone locations. 
E, MARKETING: This issue will be addressed at a later date. 
F. MRJ NEGOTlA TIONS: A formal proposal has not yet been offered. The recently 
scheduled meeting was cancelled due to Paul De Witt's surgery. Dr. Prochaska stated that he 
would look at the basic points of the proposed contract and meet with Drs. Traughber, Hall 
and Seaboum to discuss them. It is difficult for Dr. Prochaska to discuss too much due to 
his position on the MRJ Board. He did state that the process of obtaining an agreement is as 
important as the end result. Dr. Seaboum would like the Group to give a set of goals and 
desires to obtain with the MRI Board. Dr. Hall felt that the Group will be competing with 
the MRI Center of Idaho and this will either tear them apart or bring them closer. Dr. 
Prochaska stated that the Group needs to be unified so as not to tear them apart and casting a 
vote twice in a voting and decision making process may help in this endeavor. Both the 
Group and the MRJ Board must be willing to give up certain things to work together. Dr. 
Giles raised the question as to what can the Group bring to the MRJ Board that will help to 
persuade the.Board that ii is important to partner with the Group. The Group felt that they 
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DATE: 
PRESENT: 
ABSENT: 
RECORDING: 
DISCUSSION: 
MRI EXECUTIVE MEETING MINUTES 
June 16, 1999 
Marty Hutson, CFO, Holy Rosary Hospital 
James M Prochaska, M.D. 
Thomas E. Henson, M.D. 
David J. Giles, M.D. 
J. Roger Curran, M.D. 
John M. Havlina, Jr., M.D. 
Jeffrey Cliff, Practice Management, Inc. 
Paul DeWitt, Practice Management, Inc. 
Sandra Bruce, President & CEO, Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center 
Cindy Schamp, COO, Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center 
Milt Kutsurelis, Executive Vice President, Mercy Medical Center 
Mark Adams, CEO, West Valley Medical Center 
Paul DeWitt, Practice Management, Inc. 
The board discussed the ongoing negotiations with Saint Alphonsus Radiology 
Group for the MR1 portion of an independent imaging center located in Boise. 
The items discussed included: 
1: The purchase ofan equity position in MRI Associates by SARG. 
2: The lease of space for the MRI portion of the imaging center. 
3: Additional imaging centers. 
4: Management fee for the imaging center. 
5: Shift in management of the imaging center. 
6: Amorti7.ation of capital improvements paid out of cash flow. 
The purchase of an equity position in MRI Associates by SARG: 
The board was asked to consider a purchase price for SARG to obtain an 
ownership percentage equivalent to a member in Doctors Corp. after the buy in. It 
was noted that the four physician partners have tendered an offer to Dr. Tom 
Henson for his general partner share in the amount of $1,200,000. One possible 
method suggested was to use 900,000 or 1,000,000 as a base purchase price and 
increase or decrease that amount by 20% depending on an appraisal to be 
obtained by the hospital partners. The hospitals stated that they could not agree to 
any number without an independent appraisal. The hospitals are required to have 
an independent appraisal for any joint venture with physicians to determine 
proper FMY. Cindy Schamp stated she could have an appraisal by next board 
meeting. The hospitals also raised a concern about who should pay ll:>r lbe 
. ·-·-·--·- - ···--· ·7 --- ... 
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David I. 'Jes, M.D. 
Medical Director, MRI Center ofidaho 
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1) 
2) 
3) 
Confidential Draft for Discussion 
Restructuring oflvIRI A.ssociatcs General Partnership 
To ensure the stability of its .imaging business, SARMC needs to 
provlde u long-term equity incentive opportunity for irs 
rad:iologists; at prest,nt, thi.s objective can only be achieved within 
the framework of'MRl Associate.s (the "Partnership") 
Currnnl staff radiologists d(; not view participation m MRI 
A.~sociat,,s as an attractive long-term equity incentive due to 
economic une.crtainiy with M.RI Mobile ("Mobile") and political 
concerns regarding Doctors lvfognetic: Resornmce, !ne, ("DMR") 
The kev to restructurina the Par1ncrshil1 is control of Board of ~ "" . Directors, of whicb DMR ewTently has 50 percent of the available 
·votes 
4) Any restru.ctwfog of the P.,rt11ership is 1mlikcly to occur withollt a 
buy-out of l IJ() percent of DM.R's Partnership interest 
5) .Purchase of DMR's partm;rship interest appears 
attraetive, albeit potentially inflated given the 
rat.clvolu1ne pmjeotions of Mobile's nwnagemem 
~,-:>:>11A1·al]v 1,1,.,,'-" \.J ,. ., 
aggressive 
6) Deve.Joping a restructuring plan is ern:riplicated by differing 
economic and/or political objectives of the General .Partnei ("GP'') 
members, and potential legal ehalfonges by Li:rnited Partner ("LP'') 
members of Mobtle and MRI fdaho ("Idaho") 
7) Depending on the specific rnsimctmillg. plan, Mobil\; may no 
longer be a financial viable entity with its current capital structure 
8) A complete liquidation of the Partnership may prove w he an 
at1raetivc alternative to a rentnwturing scenario, although lbc 
financial implications II> GJ' m.ernbers have no1 been fully ai::sessed 
· App. 27 
2 
SARMC06359 
Office of the CFO 
' ' 
OPERA TING AGREEMENT 
OF 
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL 
IMAGING, LLC 
App. 29 
1 
SARMC02163 
.. _Ei'FICE OF THE CFO_ ·-
interest in the MRI operation as provided in Section 7.3.2. If and when Diversified Care 
acquires a 50% interest in the MRI operation, this Agreement will apply to the ownership, 
operation and management of both the MRI and non-MR! operations of the Company. 
1.2. Formation. ICR formed the Company pursuant to the Act by filing Articles of 
Organization on July 23, 1999. By execution of this Agreement, Diversified Care is admitted 
as a Member of the Company effective as of the date of this Agreement. Upon the request 
of the Managing Committee or <\S required by law, the parties shall promptly execute all 
amendments of the Articles of Organization and all other documents that are needed to enable 
the Managing Committee to accomplish all filing, recording, publishing and other acts 
necessary or appropriate to comply with all requirements for the operation of the Company 
under the Act. 
1.3. Intent. It is the intent of the Members that the Company be operated in a 
manner consistent with its treatment as a "partnership" for federal and state income tax 
purposes. It is also the intent of the Members that the Company not be operated or treated as 
a "partnership" for purposes of Section 303 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code. No Member 
shall take any action inconsistent with the express intent of the parties hereto as set forth 
herein. 
1.4. Definitions. Capitalized terms used in this Agreement are defined in Article 2. 
ARTICLE 2 DEFINITIONS 
The following terms used in this Agreement shall have the meanings described below: 
2.1. "Act" shall mean the Idaho Limited Liability Company Act, Idaho Code, Title 
53, Chapter 6, as may be amended from time to time. 
2.2. "Adjusted Basis" shall have the meaning given such term in Section 1011 of 
the Code. 
2.3. "Adjusted Capital Account Deficit" means with respect to any Member, the 
deficit balance, if any, in that Member's Capital Account as of the end of the relevant Fiscal 
Year, after giving effect to the following adjustments: (i) credit to that Capital Account the 
amount by which that Member is obligated to restore or is deemed to be obligated to restore 
pursuant to the penultimate sentences of Treasury Regulation Sections l.704-2(g)(l) and 
(i)(5); and (ii) debit to that Capital Account tl1e items described in paragraphs (4), (5) and (6) 
in Section l.704-l(b)(2)(ii)(d) of the Treasury Regulations. This definition of Adjusted 
Capital Account Deficit is intended to comply with the provisions of Section 
l.704-l(b)(2)(ii)(d) of the Treasury Regulations and shall be interpreted and applied 
consistently therewith. 
OPERATING AGREEMENT - 2 
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St. Alphonsus overview 
October 11 2001 
Page?. 
vote. MRIA provides MRI services through two limited partnerships, 
MRI Center of Idaho LP ( 1'MRICI") whose primary operations are the 
provision o( MRI services on the campus of SARMC and MRI Mobile LP 
("MRIM") which provides mobile MRI imaging on routes thro..1ghout 
Idaho ~nd ir,,to Oregon, Washi.ngtor. and Nevada, 
The radiology group associated with St. Alphonsus, Gem State 
Radiology ( "GSR"} , does the reads for the magnets on the SAR.MC 
campus but does not share in the profitability of the facility, 
which is a source of significant aggravation to GSR. This 
situation may be further exacerbated by the fact that two of the 
physician general partners were founding members of GSR. SARMC 
would like t.o share ownership of the magnets on its campus with GSR 
and enter into additional jo~nt ventures in adjoining communities 
with the practice. Unfortunately, the non-compete agreement 
contained in General Pnrtnership Agreement for MRlA precludes SARMC 
from doing so. 
SARMC has been exploring ways to exit MRIA but has met resiscance 
from the other general partners 1 particularly the physiciall:,, and 
from Jack Floyd, the recently appointed CEO of MRIA. (Reasons for 
this resistance are discussed later in the memorandum.) From the 
correspondence provided, SARMC is frustrated with the situation and 
is strongly considering simply withdrawing from MRIA and competing 
with the exiting MRI facilities on its own campus nfter the end ot 1 
the one~year r.on~compctc agreement. SARMC has been advised by 
counsel that this option would likely engender litigation with 
MRIA. 
SHP has been engaged by SARMC to prepnx~ o .Stra::egic Options 
Assessment { 11 SOA"} tcgardi:ig the options available for achieving 
their objectives of own:ing the facilities on their campus and being 
permitted to enter into addiLional joi11t venture MRI facilities 
with GSR. Further, SARMC has made it clear that they cannot use 
any funds of St. Alphonsus, nor can they incur debt, to achieve 
these objectives. As per the engagement agreement, SHP must 
deliver the SOA by October 21, 2001. Following the completion of 
the SOA, SHP will advise SARMC on a potential transaction involving 
that ownership stake. 
ownership and operations of MRI Associates GP and Affiliates 
Ownership Structure 
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St. AlphoMus Reg!~nal Medical C8nler Struta9ic Options Auessmenl - MRIA lus«iotes 
Overview of MRIA and Affiliates 
Overview 
MPJA ha gener;,.l p,\!UH:rshlp that ddivcn fixed and nwbile MR[ ~l:':rvict,s through tl'l'_f> !imit<".<1 
P~:.r:!'<:iJhipS, .. ~ffilCI_ ao_() \~f P"!: ... 
" M:RIA h,,s no ,1%,;t~ and pr,wi,k~ no scnice., din:clly. ln~rc~cl, 1'1RIA . .-i<""rivl:':, r,·v.-n111:-: frnrn 
1rurn,i.gemel'lt foe~ charged to MRJC! and MRlM •:qual rn apprr.Jximaceli· 7:~':'!,. qf._rey_c:nuc. ln 
addition, tiRL\ re<:dves distrlburfon,; for iL, din.·cr. t,wnersldp iiitcn~si~ in·\,JRfCl ~r,d -~1RIM. 
• MR/Cl·, opcradom l'.onsi.it_. prh1.1arUr, i)f ttH: provision of MRI savk(:s on r.he. SAR.lvlC (;amriu~, 
<;}wn, it O¼'nS tw,, rnag-nr.,t8. MRIM (dhi.mscd bdowi k:L~es s,:rv\c,~, trnm emplovc:(;S ,,f Mf/.JCL 
• MlUM began by oilcr\ng mobik h-1.Rf. ~c1v1c<n t.o rb.c other h\)apitalr. wH.hin the grncr:.J parm<mhip. 
These! mobile rn~tgm:.n h:we liin,:e been repl~-1\:ed. ,.,i1h fixed .magnet~ but th1: relationship n:rnruns 
with M:RIM, Iu addition. MRIM nms i-outes t.hrough0u.t lib.ho an<l lu.H.> Oregon, Washington ar1"d 
Nevil<.tl. and phi-n~ thrthcr cxpan~ion in !),font:ana. 
Ownership. 
MRIA, MRlCI au<l MR!M (colkcuvdy-th,:: "Entilies",l an: principally owned hy four area healrh mtc-mit 
(indudi.ngSAKMC), and aphy.~ldan inv~Mn!" g-rnup, I\n(:tm·~ Magnr:tk R,:mnan<:~. he (';DMR"i A 
brief <kstripu.on of e,11:h shareh.oldcr follow.,. 
• St. Alph<msus Regiimal Medka.! Center: SARMC primarily r<.)misL\ of ;1 28 l-h<ei.1 facility in Boi~<', I!). 
!t i.1 a mernlwr 1.1f Trinity Health (forrnaly a mcrnbci-(,f J.-lnly Crn~s Health S)-'.'ilcm prior t.o its 
merger wi1.il M.cr<y) ;md i, tile desigrw.wd trnuma omter in thl' Bois,.; region. 
• llfodN<.>"~ MedNo~· i~ a for-prnli!, wh<,lly-owncd suhddhry nf Mt:'.r<:y t,..kdical Ccmcr, N;tmpa, :, 
Catholic Health Initiat.i.v~~ facility. 
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St. A!phonsus R:egioncJ Medical Center Strategic Options Assesiment w MRJA Auodotes 
Overview of MRIA and Affiliates (cont'd) 
The ownership structures of h'.lRI.A and its affili.ites are prtscntcd below: 
0....-,.,.,.,,bip of MJU(.."l 
lllinl,U~ 
85.\RMC 
O!,hdNow 
CJH.RMC 
•He:l!U\Tr,11<1 
SIO!h~u 
•MRI.A 
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lilDMR 
8SARMC 
OMtclN<>w 
Cl rffi..\1C 
aH~1>l(b1'm'>< 
<.1-M,.,nhip ,,f UR.IM 
11% 
<0%~ .. !% 
'" J(IJ'p 
-~ARMC 
OMr.d-'fo'"' 
• fft"..t!dl'T ru,;i 
'Ql(Hfier, 
aMRJ.\ 
GMlUGl 
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1. Objective: 
St. Alphonsus - MRIA 
Rcstrilcturc Proposal 
Discussion Outline w/ Dr. Curran 
> Si\RMC desires to make an offer to acquire all non-Si\RMC interests in 
MRlCI. Discuss process of MR!A collapse and exchange of MR!M units 
(collectively, the "Transaction"). 
> As previously descrined, SARMC's primary motivation ,n pursuing the 
process to restructure the MRlA partnerships, is to allow SARMC to enter 
into a fully aligned partnership with the rndiology group, !Ml. 
> In order for Si\RMC to execute the Transaction that gives it complete 
ownership of MRJCI. it must have simultaneously negotiated a transaction 
with the !Ml physicians to buy into/merge their facilities with MR!Cl. 
;.; Therefore, the valuation of MR!Cl must he agreed upon by Si\RMC, DMR 
and JMJ, as well as the other MRlA partners. 
2. Desired Process: 
> Shattuck Hammond needs to update its financial model with the final year-end 
results for MRlA, MRlCl and MRIM. 
~ Shattuck Hammond nee<ls lu reconfirm its rorecasl assumptions given curren! 
murket conditions. 
}> In order to assure that the forecast assumptions are in line with what would be 
acceptable to IMI to buy into MRJCJ, Shattuck Hammond would like to get 
the permission of the DMR physicians to review our conclusions on 
forecasted volume trends, reimburse.ment trends, expense asSumptions, 
discount rates and terminal values - and consequently a derived valuation 
range - with Jeff Cliff. 
> If this range is generally agreeable to Jeff Cliff, SARMC would present the 
values of MRI/\, MR!Cl and MRIM to DMR and present a proposal of how 
the pa11nerships could be restructured to provide SARMC complete ownership 
of MRlCl and dispose of its ownership interest in MRIM. 
> Consummaiion of the transaction will still be dependent upon SARMC antJ 
IM! simultaneously effecting a merger transaction of the MR!Cl and lMI 
businesses. 
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Via Hand Delivery 
J. Roger Curran, M.D. 
Chairman, Board of Partners 
MRI Associates 
4227 Tio Lane 
Nampa, Idaho 83686 
Re: Notice of Withdrawal 
Dear Dr. Curran: 
@ 
Saint Alphonsus 
Regional Medical Center 
February 24, 2004 
For numerous reasons Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. ("SADC') has decided to 
withdraw as a partner in MRI Associates, Inc. Saint Alphonsus has on four occasions 
tried to buy the MRl Center ofldaho operations and achieve a mutual agreeable 
withdrawal from MR1 Associates. This has been done at great expense to Saint 
Alphonsus and without success. Recent experience suggests that further attempts will 
likewise not be successful. 
Saint Alphonsus therefore concludes that it is compelled to withdraw from the MRI 
Associates. Please consider this letter as notice, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 53-3-
601 as Saint Alphonsus' express will to withdraw effective as of April 1, 2004. 
Upon Saint Alphonsus' dissociation on the date described above, MRI Associates is 
obligated to purchase Saint Alphonsus' interest in compliance with Idaho Code Section 
53-3-701. The buyout price is equal to the greater of the amount that would be 
distributed to Saint Alphonsus if the partnership were liquidated as of withdrawal date or 
the value based on a sale of the entire business as a going concern without Saint 
Alphonsus as a partner and the business wound up as of that date. Please consider this 
letter as a demand for payment at that price. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 53~3-701 (e), ifwe arc unable to agree upon a price for 
Saint Alphonsus' interest within 120 days from the date of this demand for payment, then 
MRI Associates is obligated to pay to Saint Alphonsus the amount MRl A,gsociates 
estimates is due, plus interest. That estimate must be accompanied by the items identified 
l 055 North Curtis Road • Boise, Idaho 83706-! 370 • /208) 367·2121 • www.saintalphomus.o:g 
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IM ;jj Mobile I 
11\l;II Center of Idaho] 
~ ~ of Excellence 
March 5, 20(!4 
Sandra Bnicc 
Chief Executive Office, 
CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENT 
OFFER MAl)E PURSUANT TO LR E 408 
St. /\!p'.·1on!-:us Regional Mt\dical Center 
1055 North Cu11is Road 
Boise, lD 83706 
Re: MRI Associates 
Dear $3.ndra: 
MRf Associa:es ("MR!A") has received your letter of withdrawal from MRJA 
which discussed your perception th::i.t the transaction you desire could not be 
achieved. V./c nre concerned that the v,:ithdrawal of SL Alphonsus Re3ional 
Medical Cemer ("SARMC") from MR1A could lead to lirigation. In order lo 
avoid such a result, and before MRl1\ rcsronds formally to that letter, MRIA 
wanted to offer SARMC the opportunity to purchase the ~1RI Center of Idaho 
("MRI Center") and lo sell its interest in MRI Mobile Limited Partnership 
("MRI Mobik1'). This is the transaction that you proposed rind Lhc one that 
\VC Jrnvc hcen investigating. As yon know, \ifR IA has cmployc<i rrofessionals 
to analyze its business in order to dctcnnine a reasonable and fair value for 
both MR! Center and ~1Rl Mobile. That analysis has now been completed 
and [he MRIA Board of Partners hilss unanimously directed us lo present this 
offer to S/\RMC. 
MBJ.~_mtr1:. MRIA hereby offers lo sell the MRI Center to SARMC based on 
a valuation of MRI Center of$35,000,000 exclusive of its interest in MRl 
Mobile, After adjustment for SARMC's combined partnership interests (i.e., 
GP and LP interests) this would rcyuire a $27,440,000 payment by SARMC. 
Thal payment would be reduced by the purchase price for MRl Mobile 
discussed in the next paragraph. The valuation was detennined on an Has is0 
basis with SAR.MC as a partner and without consideration of the savings tha1 
SAR.MC may experience from its existing infrastructure. 
MRI Mobile. MRlA hereby offers, in conjunction with the sale of the MR] 
Center to SARJvlC, to purchase SARMC's interests in MRI Mobile based on a 
valuation of MRI Mobile of $15,000,000. Therefore, the amount that MRJi\ 
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MRIA Damages - From IMI Downtown 
Lost Scans I 434 I 2,033 I 3,01 I I 2,600 I 2,180 I 1,950 I 1,667 1,548 I I 5,423 
Lost Profits I $252,749 I $ 1,254,972 I $1,927,852 I $1,566,169 I $ 1,37s,11s I $1,274,214 I $963,754 $ 8os,so1 I $ 9,420,332 
MRIA Damages - From lMI Meridian 
0\ 
"'1' 
Lost Scans I I, 184 I 2,340 I 2,832 I I I I • 2,989 3,069 12,414 Q. Q. 
Lost Profits I ($1,542,722) I $ 1,249,386 I $ 1,608,108 I $1,711,793 I $ 1,523,221 I $4,549,786 1 < 
MRIA Damages - From IMI SARMC 
Lost Scans I 62 I 2,922 I 2,984 
Lost Profits I $29,420 I $1,383,649 I $1,413,069 
'2:2.7 
CERTIFICATE OF ASSUMED BUSINESS NAME 
· (Please type or print lf#glbly, s,e, im1truc;tlons on reverse.) , 
. To the SECRETARY OF STATE, STATE OF IDAHO 
Pursuant to Section 5,3-504, Idaho Code, the undersigned 
· · gives notice of adopti()n of an Assurneg BL1stness N~me. 
1. The assu!i:Jed business name which the undersjgned use(s) In. the transaction of 
business Is: · · 
MRI Center of Idaho 
2. The true·name(s) and business addre$s(es) of the ~ntlty or lndlvldual(s) doing 
business· under the assumf.!-d business name ls/are: · 
Name c.ompJete Address 
MRI limited Partners.hip 949 NQ.rt_h_.Cl!rti~ Road 
· Bo 1 se, ldaho 83706 
3. The general type of business transacted under the e~~ynied Ql.lSines~ 0~111~ is: 
(ma,k only those lhat apply) _ . - _ 
Gl ReUii! Tr~de . 
GI Wholesale Trade. 
· C&I · Services 
D · M~11ufac.tL1rln9 · D · · 
D Asiricultur@ D · 
D Co'nstruction . [J 
Tr@nepo.rtatlon ~nr;I P4bflc. Utllitli:,s 
Finance; Insurance, and Real Estate 
Mining 
4. The name_ and address to Which future 
correspondence should be a~dressed: 
Phone number (o~tional): --,---.....---,--,.--
Jeffrey· R. Cliff .. 
P.O. Box 8359 
Boise, ~~aho 83707 
5. Name and add~ess for this acknowledgment 
-copy is (If blher tha11 # 4 above)_:· 
Same 
e\.lbmit-9fll~vaf~ gf 
Assumed Business 
Name and $2.0~0I) fee to: 
Secretary of State 
700.WQst Jefferi}on 
'Basement West' . 
PO.Box 83720 .; 
:i:;~~.;:;:0-ooao -
~n,tary of State u111t onl1 
Signature: __ t;_q_...,....· .,_,_·...._· .,......~-----. · .. 8 
Printed· Name: 
------.....-----
Karl Kurtz 
Capacity: Member, Board of Partners 
(sea Instruction # 8 on back or form) 
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